Julian D. Steele v. Mary Steele Crocker by unknown
Record No . 3724 
In the 
Supre1ne Court of Appeals of Virginia 
at Richrnond 
JULIAN D. STEELE 
v. 
MARY STEELE CROCKER 
FHll:\I cmct:TT l'Ol'HT OF l•' l tl•:1, ~:1ucK COl'NIT. 
RULE 5 :12-BH.IlGlt'S. 
~5. N' t r.M Rl-:R Or' CoPtES. Twe11Ly-(ive copies of eaell hrief i-lrnll 
be filetl with the cle rk of lhe Cl> Hrl , 11 11d ut h:ast three copies 
mai led or dcli\'urc:d to oppo:;ing c1rn11:;d on or before the day 
on whid1 ilic brief i:s filet1. 
~G. ~rzH AXIJ T YPE. Briefs :-lmll 1111 11i11e inches iu length and 
:,ix im:hn:,; iu width. so ns fo <:>onform iu dimensions to the 
pri 11 tr·d l'l!t'onl, and s}iall he p riu f Nl iu type not less in size. ns 
to lwig lt t a ucl width, t bnn the t:vpe in wh ich tl1e record is 
pri11tPcl. rl 'lie n •c•o rrl n umher of flt c cn~c antl the names and 
;1tldn,:,.;~c·s of c•01mscl submitti ng the hricf slia ll be printed on 
tlw f' rn11 t con1r. 
i\L B. WATT S, Cle rk. 
Court opens at 9 :30 a. m. ; Adjolll'ns at 1 :00 p. m. 


IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND 
Record No. 3724 
VIRGINIA: 
In the Clerk's Office of the Supreme Court of Appeals at 
Richmond on the 12th day of April, 1950. 
JULIAN D. STEELE, Plaintiff in Error, 
against 
:MARY STEELE CROCKER, Defendant in Error. 
F,rom Circuit Court of Frederick County. 
This is to certify that upon the petition of Julian D. Steele 
a writ of error and superscdea.~ has been awarded by one of 
the Justices of the Supreme Court of Appeals to a judgment 
rendered by the Circuit Court of Frederick county on the 
23rd day of November, 1949, in the cause therein depending 
wherein :Mary Steele Crocker was plaintiff and petitioner was 
defendant, provided the petitioner or some one for him shall 
enter into bond with sufficient security in the clerk's office of 
the said Circuit Court in the penalty of Twelve Thousand 
Dollars, conditioned as the law directs. 
In the Circuit Court of Frederick County, Virginia. 
:Mary Steele Crocker, Plaintiff.: 
v. 
Julian D. Steele, Defendant. 
CERTIFICATE OF TRIAL .JUDGE. 
Following is a certification of the record in the abQve,:-en-
titled action, made pursuant to Rule 21 of the Rule$'!:of the 
Supreme Comt of Appeals of Virginia. ·" · l · 
ELLIOTT MARSHALL: 
Judge of the Circuit Court of Frederick 
County, Virginia. 
2 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
RECORD 
Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of Frederick County. 
Mary Steele Crocker, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Julian D. Steele, Defendant. 
NOTICE OF MOTION. 
To Julian D. Steele: Take Notice: 
You are hereby notified that on the 2nd day of February, 
1949, between the hours of 10 :00 a. m. and 5 :00 p. m. of that 
day, or as _soon thereafter as it may be lieard, the undersigned 
will move tlie Circuit Court of Frederick County, Virginia, at 
Winchester, Virginia, for a judgment against you for the 
sum of $25,000, which sum is due and owing by you to the 
undersigned for damages wrongs and injuries hereafter set 
f 01·th, to-wit: 
That heretofore, to-wit: on the 4th day of February, 1948, 
at ubout 11 :20 in the forenoon the undersigned was riding 
as a guest in a 1933 Dodge sedan owned and operated by you, 
and at said time proceeding south on U.S. Rt. #11 at or near 
Bartonsville, Frederick County, Virginia, at which time there 
was snow on the highway. The highway was slippery, visi-
bility was poor, and a light snow was falling. As said auto-
mobile was proceeding along said road just south of Bartons-
ville, Virginia at a point where said U. S. Rt. #11, which is 
a three-lane highway, proceeds up-grade for approximately 
one-half mile and curves slightly to the east and drops over a 
crest of a hill just south of Bartonsville, three snow 
page 2 ~ plows being operated by agents of the State of Vir-
ginia were proceeding in a southernly direction 
roughly in tandem formation; the first of said snow plows be-
ing opented in the middle lane of traffic at or east of the 
center of tl1e said road; the second and third were respectively 
following the first and second plows above referred to. At the 
same time and place, a 1947 Oldsmobile automobile owned by 
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Mary E. Newton and driven by James C. Lewis was proceed-
ing north on said highwuy, and was being operated at a proper 
speed and under proper control along the eastern or its right 
lane of said highway. · 
And at the said time and place you approached and passed 
or attempted to pass said snow plows as they and you were 
proceeding up the north side of said hill and around said 
curve. 
It then and there and was your duty in operating said 
automobile: 
1. To keep the same under proper control; 
2. Not to exceed a reasonable speed under the circum-
stances and traffic conditions existing at the time; 
3. Not to overtake and pass another vehicle proceeding in 
the same direction upon approaching a grade when your view 
along the highway was obstructed: 
4. Not to overtake and pass another vehicle proceeding in 
the same direction upon approaching a curve in the highway 
where your view along the highway was obstructed; 
5. Not to pass or attempt to pass three vehicles abreast, 
moving in the same direction ; 
page3 ~ 6. To drive your said automobile at a speed and 
in a manner so as not to endanger the life, limb or 
property of any person; . 
7. To drive your automobile in tl1e right lane of traffic ex-
cept wl1en overtaking and passing another vehicle in a proper 
and legal manner; 
8. In passing the Newton vehicle to give to said vehicle, 
as nearly as possible, one-half of the roadway; 
9. When entering tlle East lane of traffic in wbich the New-
ton vehicle was proceeding, to see if sucb lane of traffic was 
free of oncoming automobiles for a sufficient distance ahead 
to permit such overtaking and passing to be made in safety 
and to give the rigllt of way to said Newton vehicle; 
10. To use the center lane of traffic in passing another ve-
hicle proceeding in the same direction and not to enter the 
East or the left lane of traffic in passing another vehicle pro-
ceeding; in the same direction; 
11. To keep a proper lookout for vehicles approaching in 
the opposite direction. 
But notwithstanding these said duties you operated said 
automobile in a grossly negligent manner and with gross neg-
ligence you: 
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1. Failed to keep your car under proper control; · 
2. Exceeded a reasonable speed under the circumstances 
and traffic conditions existing at the time; 
. 3. Did overtake and pass the said snow plows, 
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approached a grade and the crest of the hill, when 
your view along the highway was obstructed; 
4. Did overtake and pass the snow plows as they we1·e pro-
ceeding in the same direction as you were approaching a curve 
in the highway, where your view along the highway ~as ob-
structed; .. · 
5. Did pass. three vehicles abreast moving in the same di-
rection, to-wit: the said three snow plows; 
6. Did drive said automobile at a speed and in a manner so 
as to endanger the life, limb and property of the under-
signed; 
7. Failed to drive your said automobile in the right or West 
traffic lane when it was impossible for you to overtake and 
pass the snow plows in a proper and legal manner. 
8. Failed in passing the Newton vehicle to give to the said 
vehicle, as nearly as possible, onc-lmlf of the roadway ; 
9. Did enter the East lane of traffic in which the Newton 
vehicle was proceeding when you, with the exercise of due 
care, should have realized that said lane might not be free 
of traffic for a sufficient distance aI1cad to permit you to over-
take and pass the snow plows in saf cty and give the right of 
way to said Newton vehicle; 
10. Failed to use the center lane of traffic in passing the 
snow plows, but instead did enter the East or the left lane of 
traffic wl1e11 passing the snow plows; 
page 5 ~ 11. Failed to keep a proper lookout for vehicles 
approaching in the opposite direction, such as the 
Newton vehicle; driving your said vehicle in such a manner 
that it collided with said Newton vehicle. 
And as n direct and proximate result of your gross negli-
gence in operating said automobile, and colliding with said 
Newton vehi~le, the undersigned, Mary Steele Crocker, suf-
fered severe bodily injuries, to-wit: severe injuries to her 
body, including thirteen broken ribs, compressed vertebra in 
her back, punctured lung, broken collar bone, cuts, bruises, 
pains, abrasions and injuries to her extremities and to other 
parts of her body. She was required to undergo protracted 
medical care consistin~ of twentv-five davs in the Winchester 
Memorial Hospital and approxfmatcly tliree months care at 
home under the supervision of a registered nurse. In addi-
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tion to the above, tbe undersigned, who was pregnant at said 
time, suffered severe shock to her nervous system, and con-
tinues to suffer great pain, both mental and physical, as a 
1·esult of the injuries above ref erred to. All of which caused 
plaintiff to spend large sums of money, to-wit: $3,000.00,' and 
to become liable for other large sums of money in an attempt 
to cure herself of the injuries of which she was and is and 
will be suffering. For all of which plaintiff suffered injuries, 
both temporary and permanent, because of which and because 
of the mental and physical pain, anguish and the shock to her 
system, temporary and permanent, plaintiff claims 
page 6 ~ damages in the sum of $25,000. 
KERN&KERN 
Counsel 
/s/ MARY STEELE CROCKER 
By Counsel 
SERVICE AND FILING OF NOTICE. 
Executed the within Notice of Motion in \Vinchester, Fred-
erick County, Virginia., on the Uth day of January, 1949, by 
delivering a true copy hereof in writing to Julian D. Steele 
in person. 
/s/ ROBERT L. DeHAVEN 
Sheriff of Frederick County, 
Virginia. 
Filed in the Office of tl1e Clerk of the Circuit Court for 
Frederick County, Va. this 17th day Jan., 1949. 
Virginia: 
/s/ KATHRYN LINEWEAVER 
D. Clerk. 
In the Circuit Court of Frederick County. 
~Iary Steele Crocker, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Julian D. Steele, Defendant 
6 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
PLEA OF NOT GUILTY. 
The said defendant, Julian D. Steele, by his attorney, comes 
and says : That he is not guilty of the premises in 
page 7 } this action laid to his charge, in manner and form 
as the plaintiff hath complained. And of this the 
said defendant puts himself upon the country. 
JULIAN D. STEELE 
Bv Is I ,J. SLOAN KUYKENDALL 
• · · Counsel 
J. SLOAN KUYKENDALL 
Counsel for defendant. 
Filed in the Office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court for 
Frederick County, Va. this 16th day Feb., 1949. 
page 8 } Virginia : 
LEE N. "WHITACRE 
Clerk 
By: /s/ VA. GOODEN. 
In the Circuit Court of Frederick County. 
:Mary Steele Crocker, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Julian D. Steele, Defendant 
Testimony and other incidents of the trial of the above-
entitled action before the trial judge and a jury in the 
Circuit Court of Frederick County, Virginia, on the 22nd and 
23rd days of November, 1949. 
Appearances: Harry R. Kern, Jr., Esq., ,vinchester, Vir-
ginia, and Harry K. Benham, Esq., "\Vinch<.>stcr, Virginia, At,. 
torneys for the Plaintiff. 
J. Sloan Kuykendall, Esq., Winchester, Virginia, and Henrv 
Hudson ·whiting, Esq., ,vinchester, Virginia, Attorneys fo'r 
the Defendant. 
The jury was duly sworn and opening statements made by 
counsel for the plaintiff and defendant. . 
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RolJert DeHave1i. 
PROCEEDINGS. 
7 
}fr. Kuykendall: Your Honor, I move to exclude thQ wit-
nesses, please. 
Judge Marshall: Mr. Clerk, call the witnesses and have 
them sworn and excluded from the courfroom. 
Mr. Kuykendall: I have no objection to the sheriff remain-
mg. 
('Vhereupon., the witnesses were called and duly sworn, af-
ter which they retired from the courtroom.) 
Mr. Kern: Sheriff DeHaven, take the witness chair. 
Whereupon, 
' I I ,1. 1 I 
SHERIFF ROBERT DeHAVEN 
was called as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, and having 
been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Kern: 
Q. You are Sheriff Robert DeHaven of Frederick County t 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you investigate this accident on the 4th of February, 
1948! 
A. Yes. 
Q. How long after the accident did you arrive? 
A. Some 15 to 20 minutes, I'd say. 
Q. ·what was the condition of the road at the scene of the 
collision! 
page 10 ~ A. Extremely slippery. It was covered with 
snow. The weather was very cold, the snow had 
packed down to the extent it was extremely slippery, and you 
couldn't tell where the edge of the hard surface left off and 
the shoulder of the road began. 
Q. How was visibility at that point 'I 
A. Very good. 
Q. '\Vas it clear, or was it still snowing Y 
A. If it was snowing, it was very light. 
l\fr. Kern: That's all. 
Mr. Kuykendall: No questions. 
('Vitness excused.) 
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John Cougil. 
Mr. Benham: Will you call Mr. CougiU 
Whereupon, 
JOHN COUGIL 
was called as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, and having 
been :first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Benham: 
Q. You are John CougiU' 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. On the ·4th day of Febrtmcy, 1948, were you driving a 
truck on Route 11 ¥ 
A. No, sir, driving a motor patrol tractor. 
Q. Will you ·tell the jury what you saw as you came through 
Bartonsville'l You know where Bartonsville is on the rightt 
A. Yes. 
page 11 ~ Q. Did a car pass you 'l 
A. Yes. sir. 
Q. Whose car was that 7 
A. Take it to be Mr. Steele's. After it happened I kne,v 
it was. 
Q. Mr. Steele's car7 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where were you when tile Steele car passed yon T 
A. Just past Bartonsville bridge, between that and Petrie's 
lane. 
Q. Let's get this straight a minute. You were driving-
what was it, you sayi 
A. Tractor. 
Q. Tractor. And was anybody in the tractor with you'l 
A. No., sir. . 
Q. Now, were any otller tractors on the road at that time'l 
A. No, sir. Two snow plows in front of me. 
Q. Where were they 1 
A. They were on the hill-on top of the hill. 
Q. In what lane of traffic were you drh~ing°l 
A. I was pushing it off the hard surface. 
Q. Out on the edge pushing it off the main highwayf 
A. Yes. 
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Q. What IaneY 
A. West lane. 
Q. What truck was immediately in front of you 'l 
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Jolin Cougil. 
A. One of Buckley Lages' trucks, hired truck. 
Q. ,vho was driving that one t 
A. Peyton, I believe. Some of those boys. 
Q. And how far out in front of you was that 1 
9 
A. They were a right smart piece. I couldn't keep up to 
them. I had a tractor, and I couldn't keep up to them. 
Q. You could still see them 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. ·where was that second truck, the middle truck? 
A. He was in the first lane, or west lane. 
Q. \Vhere was the first truck 1 
A. He was in the middle of the road, practically. 
Q. And he was in front 1 
A. Practically on top of the hill. 
Q. \Vho was driving that¥ 
A. Russell Triplett. 
Q. Did Mr. Steele pass you 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. \Vhereabout were you when be passed you 1 
A. Just across Bartonsville bridge. 
Q. What lane of traffic was he in at that time 1 
A. In the middle lane. 
Q. He passed you in the middle lane 1 
page 13 ~ A. Around the middle. You couldu 't tell, but it 
was around the middle. 
Q. What was the condition of the road 1 
A. Pretty slick. 
Q. \Vhat was the visibility1 
A. It was spitting snow. 
Q. \Vbat time of the morning was iU 
A. It was around 11 :30, somewhere around there. 
Q. After he passed you, what did l\fr. Steele doY 
A. Kept on going up the hill and passed the snow plows 
and kept bearing over. 
Q. In which direction did 110 bear oved 
A. Over to his left. 
Q. Into wlmt line of traffic1 
A. He was going over on tl1e east lane. 
Q. East lane of traffic going-
A. -going south. 
Q. Did you see him when he passed the middle truck 7 
A. I didn't pay much attention. I was ,vatching that trac-
tor, where I was going. 
Q. Did you see him after that at all 7 
:A.. I saw bim on top of the hill messed up. 
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John Cougil . . 
Q. Where was he then Y 
A. Laying upside down. 
Q. After he turned over? 
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Q. Did you see him pass the middle truck? 
A. I saw him go on past the middle truck. 
Q. And at that time what lane of traffic was he in 'l 
A. He was bearing over to the east. 
Mr. Benham: All right, your witness. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Bv Mr. Kuykendall: 
·Q. You were at the north end of that line of snow plows'l 
A. That is right., I was the last one. 
Q. ·were you down in the dip tl1ere at Petrie's lane? 
A. Yes, sir, I was right there at ~fr. Petrie's lane, about 
75 or 100 yards from the bridge down at the foot of the hill. 
Q. And in which lane of traffic were you 'I 
A. I was in the west lane pushing it off of the hard sur-
f ace. . 
Q. And so you had the west lane blocked, did you? 
A. \Vell, I was practically on-I was on the edge of the 
road. 
Q. On the edge of the road 7 
A. Pushing it off. I was the last man. 
Q. And how far from you was this other vehicle pushing 
snow? 
A. He was middleways up the hill. 
Q. And how far beyond him was the other? 
page 15 } A. Well, he was practically on top of the hill. 
Q. Now, was the road slick at that time 'I 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You say it was spitting snow? 
A. As I remember, it was. It's been so long, but I am 
pretty sure it was. 
Q. ,vas visibility poor or good? 
A. Well, it ain't too good. 
Q. Do you recall whether a horn was sounded on this ve-
hicle which passed you Y 
. A. No, sir, never heard a thing. Can't hear much in that 
tractor I drive with that cab on it. It makes right smart noise 
and doesn't have no muffler on it. 
Q. How fast was l\fr. Steele travelling, do you recall 'I 
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R. R. Trivlett • 
.A. I wouldn't say, but a moderate rate of speed.· 
Q. About what would you call o. moderate rate of speed 7 
A. I don't know. Hard to say. Hard to know. Abaut 
30, 35, 'SOmething around there. Might be going faster, might 
be going slower. I wouldn't say. I didn't have time to pay 
that much attention. . 
Q. Was anyone in the vehicle with youi 
A. No~ sir. ' · 
Mr. Kuykendall: I think that's all 
(Witness excused.) 
Mr. Benham: 1\fr. Triplett. 
· page 16 } Whereupon, 
R. R. TRIPLETT 
I "-'·'• 
was called as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, and having 
been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Bv Mr. Benham: 
·Q. Your name is Triplett, R. R. TripletU 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. For whom do you workT 
A. Work for myself now. 
Q. In 1948, February 4th were you then working for the 
State of Virginia 1 
A. Yes, the State Highway Department. 
Q. What was your job1 
A. I was operating the snow plow. 
Q. Were you in Bartonsville that morning driving the snow 
plow? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, will you tell the jury where vou were driving at 
tl1e time you passed Bartonsville and weiit up the hill bevond 
Bartonsville south of Bartonsville7 • 
A. I was in the middle lane. Three-lane highway; I was 
taking the center. 
Q. You were taking the center and you were going what 
direction I/ 
page 17} A. South. 
Q. You were driving a truck t 
.... , 
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R. R. Triplett. 
A. Yes. 
Q . .t,\.nd who was with youf 
A. Mr. Madigan. 
Q. \Vhat other trucks were on the road at that time l 
A. There was another snow plow behind me, Buckley Lages" 
truck. 
Q. Who was driving thaU 
A. I don't know, Peyton, or one of tl1cm. 
Q. And then was there a ti-actor 1 
A. Yes, a tractor Cougil was driving. 
Q. Did you·s.ee l\Ir. Steele's car that morning¥ 
A. Yes. . · 
Q. ·where did you see it first Y 
A. Well, he passed me right up that bill there. 
Q. Where were you when he passed you, going up the hill'! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. \Vhat lane of traffic was Im in when be passed you 7 
A. He was in the south lane-southeast lane, I guess, out-
side lane. 
Q. Your left lane, would you call it Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you were in the center lane f 
A. I was in the center lane. 
page 18 ~ Q. Vi1lmt was the condition of the road'/ 
A. Well, it was icy, snowy, little snowing there,. 
I guess. 
Q. A.t the time Mr. Steele passed you could you see over 
the crest of the bill'/ 
A. No~ sir, not too far. Yon could see probably a couple 
hundred feet or more. 
Q. How was visibility this morning! 
A. Well, wasn't too· good. 
Q. "T as it snowing, rainingf 
A. '\Vas still snowing. 
Q. Was there snow on the road 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, what did :Mr. Steele do after I1e passed yoa 'l 
A. He got just a short ways past me and his car began to 
skid with him, Jose his hold. 
Q. In what lane of traffic was he when he skidded'/ 
A. He was trying to get over in the middle Jane, but he 
wasn't quite over there yet when l1is car began to skid. 
Q. What happened'f 
A. Another car came over tlle hill. His car mnde a com-
plete circle in the 1·oad and hit this other car. 
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Q. In what lane of traffic was this other car you speak of1 
A. I guess it was in the left lane from where I was at. 
Q. In what direction was it comingl 
page 19 } A. It was going north. 
Q. And it was in its right lane of traffic 7 
A. Yes, it was clear off the road there when I seen it. 
Q. Off the road Y 
A. Practically off the road. Over on the shoulder. 
Q. Was it moving when you saw iU 
A. I couldn't say. 
Q. Did l\Ir. Steele have chains on that morningf 
A. No, sir. 
Q. w·hat speed would you say be was travelling! 
A. ,v en, I couldn't hardly say. 
Q. ·what speed were you travelling7 
A. About 15 mile an hour, I guess. 
Mr. Benham: That's all. Your witness. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Kuykendall: 
Q. In what position of the road did you say your vehicle 
was¥ 
A. In the center lane. 
Q. And how far was it from the top of the hill when Mr. 
Steele passed you 7 
A. ,v eu, I will say it's a couple hundred feet on this side 
of the hill there. 
Q. And you say he had, or had not, gotten back 
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A. He hadn't been back in, no, sir. 
Q. How far was his car from you when it started to skid f 
A. Oh, I don't expect it wns over 50 feet there . 
. Q. And how fnr away from you wns this other cnr that was 
off the road on the east side when Mr. Steele passed you 7 
A. Well, it wasn't too far. I wouldn't say just how fnr it 
was. 
Q. About how far? 
A. Well, I don't expect he was but a couple hundred feet, 
300 feet. 
Q. That's two to three hundred feeU 
A. Yes. 
Q. So this car tlmt Mr. Steele ,vns driving was skidding for 
what distance, then, before it struck that car? 
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William Madigan. 
A. ,v en, a right smart piece there. She made a complete 
circle around in the road. 
Q. And you say you don't know how fast }Ir. Steele was 
driving? 
A. Not exactly. I couldn't tell too much. He was driving 
right lively. 
Q. Estimate his speed. 
A. I wouldn't hardly say. About 40 mile, I will say. 
:Mr. Kuykendall: I think that's all. 
(Witness excused.) 
page 21 } Mr. Benham: ,vould you ask Mr. Madigan to 
come inY 
·whereupon, 
WILLIAM MADIGAN 
was called as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, and having 
been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By :Mr. Benham: 
Q. Your name is William :Madigan? 
A. That's right. 
Q. On February 4, 1948, for whom were you working? 
A. Highway Department. 
Q. State of Virginia Y 
A. State of Virginia. 
Q. On the morning of February 4th what were you doing1 
A. Plowing snow. 
Q. Were you near Bartonsville Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. In whose truck were you plowing snowY Who was in 
the truck with you? 
A. Mr. R.R. Triplett. 
Q. The gentleman who just testified here? 
A. That's right. 
Q. You weren't driving, he was driving? 
A. He was driving. 
Q. In which direction were you travellingT 
page 22 } A. We were travelling south. 
Q .. In what lane of traffic? 
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Q. Did a car pass you after yon passed Bartonsvillef Do 
you know where Bartonsville is i 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know the hill going up beyond Bartonsville 7 
A. That's right. · 
Q. Did a car pass you as you were going up that hill I/ . 
A. I never saw any car. I was looking out through the 
field about that time resting my eyes when the thing happened. 
l\fr. Triplett said, "Look out", and I looked around, butdt ·: 
all done happened then. · 
Q. What did you seef 
A. The cars were all laying on the road then. 
Q. What was the condition of the road at that poinU 
A. Well, there was snow on the road. It was slick. 
Q. How far in front of your truck did the accident occur i 
A. Well, I'll say by the time we got stopped it wasn't over 
about 25 yards ahead of our truck ·by the time we got stopped. 
I couldn't say how far it was ahead when it happened. 
:Afr. Benham: Your witness. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Kuykendall: 
Q. Mr. Triplett wa~ driving the vehicle you .were in? 
A. That's right. 
page 23 } Q. And that was the one farthest south i 
A. That's right, in the center lane. 
Q. Do you know how far it was from the crest of the hill 
when it passed Y · 
A. I imagined when it happened it was almost at the crest. 
Q. Did you see the Steele car when it passed Y 
A. No, sir. 
Mr. Kuykendall: I think that's all. 
(Witness excused.) 
Mr. Benham: Mrs. Mary Newton. 
I f! 
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Whereupon, 
:MARY NE,VTON 
was called as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, and having 
been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Benham: 
Q. Is your name Mary E. Newton t 
A. That's right. 
Q. Where do you live, Mrs. N ewtou ·f 
A. 143 South Broad, Norwich, New York. 
Q. ,v ere you in Virginia on February 4, 1948 t 
A. Yes, I was. 
Q. Were you driving on the Valley Pike at that time 'l 
.A.· "\Ve were between Stephens City and Bartonsville. 
Q. At the time of the accident 'l 
page 24 } A. Yes. 
Q. In which direction were you goingi 
A. Going in n northerly direction. 
Q. What car were you riding in! 
A. In my own one. 
Q. Your car. ·were you driving? 
A. No, I wasn't. 
Q. Where were you sitting? 
A. On the front seat. 
Q. Was anyone else besides the drivei: and you on the front 
seat'l 
A. N 0 1 jnst the two of us. Q. Who was on the back seat f 
A. Lena Moore and Mary Benn. 
Q. Who was driving the car 'l 
A. James Lewis. 
Q. Will you tell the jury what you saw as yon approached 
Bartonsville Y 
A. "\Vell, we was coming along from between Stepliens City 
and Bartonsville on top of the hill, and we see some st1ow 
plows coming and also a car trying to pass. We were riding 
along on tile edge of the road. It was slippery and it was 
snowing. "\Ye was driving very slow, in fact, just moving. 
And we see tltis car coming right toward us in our lane of 
traffic. It was one snow plow in the miclcllc of the 
page 25 } I1ighway, in the middle lane, nncl this Mr. Steele's 
car, I hearcl afterwards that lie was passing the 
snow plow and he was in our lane of traffic, and he come right 
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head on to us, and then he bounced back and hit us on the 
side. 
Q. What was the condition of the road at that point'l 
A. It was slippery and icy. 
Q. How near the crest of the hill were you when you first 
saw these trucks and the Steele car? 
A. ·wen, we come to a stop before the accident happene~ 
and our car was facing-my car was facing a sign, a danger 
sign or a curve sign on top of this hill. 
Q. On which side of that danger sign was your car? 
A. My car was right out in the ditch, all four wheels off 
the highway, facing this sign. 
Q. Facing which direction, north or south 7 
. A. North. 
Q. What lane of traffic were you in when you came towards 
this hill? 
A. ·we were in our own lane of traffic on two wheels. For 
several miles we had rode with the two wheels off the high-
way, because it was slippery. 
Q. When did you first observe the Steele carY That is, 
how far from you was it when you first saw it, approximately. 
A. Well, it was on the crest of the hill. I'd say 
page 26 ~ five or six lengths. 
Q. Could you estimate the speed of the Steele 
ca1·! 
A. No, but he seemed to be coming awfully fast. I don't 
know how fast. 
Q. Did you have a picture taken of your car after the acci-
dent, 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Is this it (handing picture) 1 
A. That's it. 
(Document referred to received in evidence as Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 1.) 
Q. Did the Steele car strike you hard, or what sort of 
blow? 
A. It struck us so hard that the hood come up, and then it 
bounced around and next thing it hit us on the side. 
Mr. Benham: Your witness. 
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CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Bv 1\fr. Kuykendall: 
0 Q. You say tlmt the road was so slippery that you drove 
with two wheels off on the shoulder to keep from slipping7 
A. ,ve had drove for quite a distance that way. 
Q. And you were not driving at the time, were you? 
A. No. 
Q. It was perfectly apparent to you, wasn't it, that the 
road was slippery7 
A. That's right. 
Q. And where were you riding in the carY 
page 27 ~ A. In the front seat. 
Q. Wl1crc was the Steele car when you first saw 
it, whereabouts in the road 'l 
A. I remember I just see the Steele car and the snow plows 
all about Urn same time. 
Q. Do you recall where the Steele car was when you first 
saw it? 
A. It was just about to pass the snow plows, I'd say. 
Q. How far from your car? 
A. Well., I'd say about five or six lengths when he begin to 
sJdd. 
Q. About five or six lengths. You mean automobile 
lengths'/ 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Five or six car lengths from your cad 
A. "7hen he was skidding, yes. 
Mr. Kuykendall: I think that's all. 
Judge ~Iarshall: Just a moment. May I ask this witness 
a question 1 You say five or six car lengths. How long is a 
car length? 
The Witness: I don't know. 
Judge Marshall: That's all. 
('Vitness excused.) 
l\Ir. Benham: :M:rs. Moore. 
. I 
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page 28 } was called as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, 
and having been first duly sworn, was examined 
and testified as follows : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Bv Mr. Benham: 
'Q. Your name is Lena Moore 1 
A. That's right. 
Q. Where do you live, ~frs. Moore t 
A. 67 East 124th Street, Norwich, New York. 
Q. On the 4th of February, 1948, were you driving through 
Virginia? 
A. I was. 
Q. In whose car were you driving? 
A. Mary Newton's. 
Q. And were you driving on Route 11? That's the Valley 
Pike. 
A. That's right. 
Q. In what direction were you driving? 
A. "\Ve were going towards "\Vinchester. North. 
Q. From the south? 
A. Yes. It would be north. 
Q. In what seat were you riding7 In what part of the car7 
A. I was riding in the back seat on the right-hand side. 
Q. And who else was in that carf 
A. James Lewis was driving the car, and Mrs. Newton was 
on the front seat, and :Mary Benn on the back seat with me. 
Q. You know the little place up here on the Val-
page 29 ~ lev Pike known as Bartonsville 7 
· A. I have heard of it. I am not acquainted with 
it, but I have heard the name. 
Q. You know it now, don't you? Tell the jury what hap-
pened as you approached this town. First of all, is there a 
curve and a hill there? 
A. That is right, yes. 
Q. Now, as you came near tbe crest of that hill, tell tha 
jury what happened, just what you saw and what happened. 
A. Well, it was snowing and it was slippery and we had 
been driving slow, and we bad been driving with two wheels 
in the dirt, in the ditch, and just as we got about to the crest 
I looked up nnd here was this car right in front of us. And 
it hit us in the front and bounded back and hit us again on 
the side. And we were clear off on the ditch as far as we 
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coµld go, because there was a bank, we couldn't go any farther~ 
and it just hit us and the car was smashed up. 
Q~ When did you first see this car.! 
A. When I saw it, it was right onto us. I was in tl1e back 
seat with Mary Benn, and we were talking, and I looked up 
and the car was right in front of us. Before I had a chance 
to say anything, it hit us right in the front. 
Q. What lane was he in when he struck youj 
A, He was in our lane, because we were off 
page 30 } nearly 'in the ditch. 
Q: Could you estimate the speed it was travel-
ling? · 
A. Who was that 1 
Q. Could you estimate the speed the Steele car was travel-
lingf 
A. No, I couldn't. 
Mr. Benham: Your witness. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Kuykendall: 
Q. What was the condition of the road that day¥ 
A. It was a little slippery, because it had been snowing a 
little bit, and it was a little slippery. That's why we was 
driving nearly in the ditch. 
Q. And it was perfectly clear to you that the road was 
slippery, was it'l 
A. Yes, it was slippery. 
Q. And you were not driving, were you T 
A. No, I was not. 
Mr. Kuykendall: That's all. 
(Witness excused.) 
l1Ir. Benham: Would you ask Mr. Lewis to come inT 
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was called as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, and having 
been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
page 31 ~ DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Benham: 
Q. Your name is James C. Lewis 1 
~li.. Yes, sir. 
Q. And where do you live, Mr. Lewis 7 
A. 143 South Broad Street, Norwich, New York. 
Q. l\fr. Lewis, on February 4, 1948, were you in the State 
of Virginia 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Were you driving through the State of Virginia at tl1at 
time? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And were you on Route 111 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know of a little town on Route 11 just south of 
\Vinchcster known as Bartonsville1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You drove through tlmt town t 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You drove to that town 1 
A. To there, one mile this side of Bartonsville-the other 
side of Bartonsville. 
Q. Now, will you tell the jury tlle condition of the roRd 
and the weather as you were driving toward Bartonsville that 
morning? · 
page 32 ~ A. The road was slippery and it was snowing. 
There was a little ice and snow on the ground. 
Q. ,v as there much snow on the road Y 
A. Not too much on the road. It was about eight inches on 
the side of the road. It had been plowed, I guess, a little. 
Q. Was it snowing as you drove? 
A. It was snowing, yes. 
Q. How was visibility? 
A. Verv poor. · 
O. In ,vhat lane of traffic and what direction were yon go-
ing¥ 
A. I was headed north, headed toward ,vinchester coming 
from Stephens City. 
Q. In what lane of traffic'? 
A. I had my two left wheels on the third lane and my two 
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right wheels on the shoulder of the road. 
Q. In which direction were you goingY 
A. Driving north. 
Q. Now, what is the nature of the 1·oad at Bartonsville, just 
south of BartonsvilleY Just describe it a little bit. 
A. South of Bartonsville is a three-lane highway, and I 
was travelling on there. There was a curve and a hill. 
Q. As you were coming north there was a curve and a hill? 
A. There was a cm·ye sign in front of me to show that there 
was a curve ahead. 
page 33 } Q. Whicb way does the road curve as you come 
northY 
A. Curves to the right. 
Q. That is., as you are travelling north Y 
A. That's l'ight. 
Q. And as you were coming north towards Bartonsville 
does it go curving up or down Y 
A. Goes down hill. 
Q. Now, the sign you mentioned, is that near the crest of 
the hillY . 
A. Yes, it is, yes, sir. 
Q. As you approached this sign, tell the jury-wait a sec-
ond, who was driving in tile car you were riding in? 
A. I was driving. · 
Q. And it was 1\fary Newton's cad 
A. 1947 Oldsmobile owned bv :Marv Newton. 
Q. Was she in the carY · · 
A. Yes, she was on my right in tlte front seat. 
Q. Just tell the jury as you approached the sign what you 
saw and what you did. 
A.. About five car lengths ahead of me I saw a car ap-
proaching me in the third Jane, which is mv lane of traffic, 
aµd when be approached me I tried to pull off the road there, 
and when he got probably about three car lengths ahead of 
me he went into a skid. So I moved all the way off the road, 
all four wheels off the road, and he hit me on mv left front, 
and be turned around in the middle of the road, 
page 34 } came back and struck me in the side, tipped over 
onto the side and slid into the center lane. 
Q. Did you notice any snow plows that morning¥ 
A. I noticed one in the center lane and one in the farther 
left Jane. I saw only two snow plows. 
Q. How well could you see over that hill 7 Could yon see 
that hill as you approached'/ 
A. I couldn't see to the bottom of the hill, no, sir. 
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Q. You couldn't see over the bill and around the curve? 
A. I couldn't see over it. 
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Q. Could you estimate the speed this car was approaching 
youi 
A. I would judge approximately 35 to 40 miles an hour. 
Q. Did you say anything about the surface condition of 
the roadf 
A. It was slippery. 
CROSS E.XAl\UNATION. 
By Mr. Kuykendall: 
Q. How far was the Steele car from you when it passed the 
snow plow nearest you, do you recall? 
~- No, I can't. 
Q. Could you estimate that distance? 
A. No, I don't remember just how far he was from a snow 
plow. , . . 
page 35 ~ Q. I mean, do you know how far Mr. Steele's car 
was from you when he passed the snow plowY 
A. No, I don't. 
Q. Do you know what position Mr. Steele's car was in when 
it started to skid-whereabouts in the road it was? 
A. It was in my lane of traffic when be tried to turn toward 
the center, then he started to skid immediately. 
Q. Could you see the Steele car as it was passing the snow 
plow? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You didn't see it when it passed the snow plow? 
A. All I saw was the Steele car coming in my lane of traffic. 
Q. And you didn't observe the snow plow at the time? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You say you did see two snow plows? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When did you see them 7 
A. Directlv afterwards. 
Q. After the accident T 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Not before? 
A. I saw there was cars in the road, but I didn't know at 
the time whether it was a snow plow. I was watching the car 
coming toward me. 
page 36 ~ Q. Did you see a car or other vehicle in the road 
. before the collision other than Mr. Steele's cari 
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A. Just the car that was in front of me before I saw th~ 
Steele car, that's all. 
Q. ,v en, you did see another vehicle besides the Steele car'! 
A. Just the car I had been following for about 15 miles. 
Q. But you didn't see any other cars approaching you ex-
cept the Steele car? 
A. That's all. 
Q. I believe '.you stated that you were driving with two 
wheels off of the linrd surface, is that rigbU 
A. Yes. · · 
Q. Why was that? 
A. Because the road was slippery. 
Q. How far could you see in front of you, do you know f 
You say the visibility was poor. · 
A. I could see objects like a car coming probably a hun-
dred feet. 
Q. That's alU 
A. Yes. 
:Mr. Kuykendall: I think that's all. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Benham: 
Q. How far did you say the Steele car was in 
page 37 ~ front of you when you first saw it in your lane of 
traffic? 
A. About five car lengths. 
Q. And how far was it when it started skiddingf 
A. About three. 
Q. ,vas that when it started to pull back into the center'! 
A. Yes. 
l\Ir. Benham: That's all. 
Judge !.larsl1all: ,Just a moment. How many feet do you 
estimate a car lengtll to bef 
The Witness: I should judge around 17 to 18 feet. 
Judge :Marshall: 'rhat's all. 
('Witness excused.) 
T • • 
.. .. .. . ' ... .: . . -· " . "' 
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"Whereupon, 
•1' • I • • 
·wALTER OWENS-
.was called· as a·witness on behalf of the plaintiff; and having 
been first duly sw.orn, was examined and testified as follows: 
, . \. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION . 
.. 
.. . 
By 1\-4'. Benham: · · · : · 
A
Q: Y:yom··~anie i~ __ Wa]te~·. Qweµs1 I .' • 
. · es, sir. · · 
· Q. Mr. Owens, on February 4, 1948, for wbom were you 
working? .. . . 1 A. For Buckley Lages. · . · · ·· · 
Q. A:pd were you driving on the Valley Pike that dayY 
I,,.. Yes7 sir. · . 
page 38 ~ Q: What were you· driving? 
. . . A. I was working a blade on the snow plow. 
Q. In which direction were fOU going1 
A. We was going soutb. · · ·· · • . · 
Q. Was there a snow plow in front of you Y 
4-. Yes, sir. ' " · 
Q. "\Vas anything. behind. you Y 
A. Yes, sir. .. ·. .. . 
Q. What \vas behind you '1 
' A. The patrol grader pushing the snow off the shoulder 
of the road. . . ·· ·· · · · 
Q. Now, as you came to Bartonsville-you know where 
Bartonsville is Y 
. A. Yes. 
Q. And you were driving then in a southerly direction~ is 
that right Y · · 
A. YeEZ; sir. . . . . 
. Q. What lane of traffic were.you proceeding in at .that time? 
. A .. '\Ve was proceeding on the right-hand traffic shovelling 
the snow.off to the rigl1t for the patrol grader to shov.e it off 
the shoulder. · . . . . · · 
Q: .Ariff where. was this truck in front of 1-·ou, what lane j 
A. It was on the middle drive. . . . . . . 
· Q. Now, as you went up· the J1ill at Bartonsville 
page 39 ~ -you are famjliar with Bartonsville, aren't vou ~ 
. 'A. Yes. ·· • 
Q. Did a car pass .you? 
,a. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know whose car it was? 
A. No, sir. 
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Q. Do you know now whose car it was? 
A. Well, they tell me it was that gentleman sitting over 
there. 
Q. Did you see that gentleman that dayY 
A. No, I didn't see him. 
Q. Only one car passed you? 
A. That's the only one. 
Q. And where was the driver that passed you Y 
A. It was on the third lane drive. 
Q. Is that on the east or west T 
A. That was on the left of me. 
Q. And after this car passed vou, what did it doY 
A. ,vell, as near now as I can say-of course, it's been 
quite a while-he went into a spin, went across and the New 
York car hit him. 
Q. ,Vhere was he driving when the New York car hit him¥ 
A. He cut and started to cut in front of the plow that was 
in front of us, and when be done that he went into a spin. He 
went crossways of the road, and the New York car hit him. 
Q. How near the crest of the hill was lie when 
page 40 ~ be started around the plow in front of you T 
A. As near as I can remember, he was about 
two-thirds up the hill. 
Q. That's when he started around this truckY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. ,vhich truck was that he started around T 
A. It was us when he was two-thirds of the way up the bill. 
Q. How far up the hill was he when be went around the 
truck that was in front of you? 
A. As near as I can remember, that other truck was within 
50 feet of the top of the hill. 
Q. That's when he started aronnd? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That was the truck driven by TripletU 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And when he went around that, in what lane of traffic 
was Mr. Steele driving1 
A. ,ven, now, that would be hard for me to say. 
Q. " 7here was the snow plow:, in the middle lane T 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did he go to the left of the snow plowT 
A. He started to the right of the snow plow. 
Q. ,vhen l1e started around the snow plow, which side of 
the snow plow clid he go around t 
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page 41 } A. He started to the left of the snow plow. 
Q. Then after he got around the snow plow, 
what did he try to do 1 
A. There is where he went in a spin and come crossways 
of the road. 
Q. Could you estimate the speed Mr. Steele was driving? 
A. No, sir, I wouldn't. 
Q. Wlmt was the condition of the road? 
A. It was slippery. 
Mr. Benham: That's all Your witness. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By :Mr. Kuykendall: 
Q. You were in the middle, were you not, of the snow plows, 
and you were the center one 7 
A. I was guiding the blade on the middle snow plow. 
Q. Could you see this other vehicle, the New York car, 
when it approached? 
A. The only thing I can say, I seen them when they hit, 
that's the onlv thing. 
Q. How far was the New York car from you when they hit, 
do you know? 
A. I'd hate to say. 
Q. Could you estimate tlmU 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Have you any idea how far that car was from 
page 42 ~ you when you first saw it Y 
A. The only thing I will say is that the sno,v 
plow in front of us was about 40 feet. 
Q. Forty feet what? 
A. Ahead of us. 
Q. And how far was that New York car from the front snow 
plow! 
A. "r ell, I wouldn't say. 
Q. Did you observe the situation after the collision Y 
A. No, sir, I took a flag and flagged the traffic. Never even 
stopped. · 
Q. Did yon stop immediately when the collision occurred 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The plow in front of you 7 
A. The truck that I was in stopped immediately. 
Q. Could you tell, then, how far this New York car was 
from the front snow plow? 
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A. No, sir., I won,'t f:lay. .: · .· · · · · ·· : 
Q. ·now far could you see tliat day, do you Imowi in view 
·of t~e dondition=s ofthe weather. · · : 
· A-. Now; listen, you have asked me something. That's been. 
nearly two years ago. · · ·t 
Q: You· don't ·know about, ~hatf A~ I wouldn't s·av. . . .. .. c. ·; 
Q. ,vere you there when Mr. DeHaven got there! 
t· " n:. I was· rip v.itli the flag. ' · · 
page 43 ~ '. · Q. And were the snow plows left in the same 
position when he got there! · . · · · 
A. Yes, sir. Now, I wouldn't say positively when he left 
or not. · · , 
Q. I mean· when he got there. .. .. · · · 
A. Yes, they were there when he got there. 
Q. Did you ·stop your truck immediately on the happening 
of ·the collision! · 
A~ Yes. . . . 1 : 
Q: You·diffn 1t go'imy fartlier than you had to to stop'! 
A. Yes, headed toward .tl}e right •. 
.. l : . .. ' ~~' : ' .. 
Mr. Kuykendall: I.think.that's all. . ., ... 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Benham: ' · · · 
Q. You say you stopped immediately¥ 
A. Yes.. . 
Q. Did you stay in the same lane 7 
A. No, headed to· the right. 
A
Q. ~id you pul~ ~~ to .th~ .!!gJlt,. ,you. meap 1 
. .1.es. 
•• · ! 
Q. And did the truck in front of you pull off to the right, 
toot· 
A. Yes. 
. RE.CROSS .. JnXA:MINATION. 
. . .. . 
pag~ .44 } By Mr. I{uyliendall: . . 
. . . . . Q. Ho~ far did you go in pulling off to the 
rightf . . . 
A. Well, now, that would be hard to sav .. NQw, after it's 
been about two ~~ars since it's happened, "it \vould be a hard 
matter to sl\y "how faf ·we pulled' off to the right. 
Q. Did you pull clear off the road 7 
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Q. What part of the road was your vehicle stopped on 1 
A. Well, now, I couldn't say exactly that. 
Q. Well, was it in the middle lane0 01· the southbound lane Y 
· A. It was on the outside lane, but an accident--when driv-
ing a snow plow you are supposed to prevent your own self· 
-you ai·e supposed to cut. I wouldn't say l1ow much we went 
-how far we went, or nothing about it, for it's been so long. 
I won't say whether our front wheels was clean off the 
shoulder or whether thev wasn't clean off the shoulder. 
Q. Do you know whether or not the vehicle that was in 
front of you was still on the highway when it stopped i 
A. V{ ell, I wouldn't say positively whether his wheels was 
clean off the hard surface or not. 
Q. Don't know what position it occupied 1 
A. No, sir.· 
:\Ir. Kuykendall: That's all. 
FURTHER DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
page 45 ~ By Mr. Benham: 
Q. What do you mean by "an accident-you . 
were supposed to cut", you say! 
A. Cut when the accident happened. We cut to our right 
like we was going off the hard surface, you see. 
Mr. Benham: That's all. 
(\Vitness excused.) 
\Vhereupon, 
DR. BRADFORD S. BENNETT 
was called as a witness on belmlf of the plaintiff, and having 
been first duly sworn, was examined. and testified as fol!ows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Kern: 
Q. You are Bradford S. Bennett? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long have you been practicing in \Vinchester? 
A. Since .J nnuarv of 1949. 
Q. What is your· profession, DoctorY 
30 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Dr. Brad/ ord S. Bemiett. 
A. Orthopedic surgery. 
Q. ·what training have you had in that :field 1 
A. Specialized training in orthopedics was had in tlrn army 
approximately 19, 20 months, three and a I1alf years in ortho-
pedics. Then I bad a residency in 1946 at l\Iedical College of 
Virginia. 1947 at Crippled Children's Hospital, Richmond, 
Virginia .. 1948 resident at l\lcGuire Federal Vet-
page 46 ~ erans Administration Hospital in orthopedic sur-
gery. 
Q. ,vhere did you receive your medical education Y 
A. l\Iedical College of Virginia, graduating in 1941. 
Q. Any other¥ 
A. Had an interneship in St. ,Toe's Hospital. 
Q. Did Mrs. Mary Steele Crocker come to see you i 
A. Yes. 
Q. Please tell the jury in as simple language as possible 
what it is that she is suffering from and wltat you did to help 
her and to alleviate her pains nny, and keep it as simple as 
you can so we can underAtand. 
A. I examined l\Irs. Crocker in i\fov of this vear for the 
residuals of an injury that sI1e sustained in an automobile 
accident which happened-I think it was February 4, 1948. 
She was complaining at that time of pain in lier hips, dis<iom-
fort in her back and inability to sleep, particulady on the 
right side. The findings at that time were-
1\Ir. Kuykendall: Just a minute. l\Iay I inquire whether 
Dr. Bennett treated her for these injuries 1 They haven't 
establisl1ed the injuries yet. 
,Judge Marsliall: Yes, that's true. 
Mr. Benham: Of course, this is a doctor. ,v e 'd like to 
put him on. ,ve are going to put l\Irs. Crocker on and the doc-
tor that examined her right after the accident. ,ve will have 
the doctor that has taken care of her. Just for the 
page 47 ~ convenience of tllis doctor we put him on first. Dr. 
Riley is coming. 
l\Ir. Kern: It will he connected up. 
Mr. Kuykendall·: I have no objection as long as it is con-
nected, but I reserve the right to ri1ove that it be stricken if 
it is not. 
Judge Marshall: If they don't connect it up, I will strike 
it out. 
Bv Mr. Kern: 
·Q. Go ahead now. 
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A. The :findings at that time were confined primarily to 
the examination of tlie right shoulder and the back. The 
patient was ambulatory with hesitant gait. She had a limp 
and wliat is known as a list or a sway towards one ·side of the 
body, towards the right side. She had a deformity of the 
back, with a-I can't think of the proper term-with a curve 
of the back. Her back is curved in two directions, ~urved 
backwards and to the right. An examination of the· 1ower 
extremities revealed pain in both hips when certain tests were 
made for evidence of injury in the back and pelvis. 
Do vou want what I recommended?. 
Q. Before you get to that,. I'd like to ask you this: Did 
you make any X-rays, or were any made available to you? 
A. Yes, I consulted her old X-rays and recommended some 
new X-rays, which were made. 
Q. Now, what did you ascertain from these 
page 48 } X-rays as to her condition, or from what she was 
suffering as a result of these injuries? 
A. Well, they showed evidence of, of course, the old frac-
tures of the ribs., multiple rib fractures-
Q. By that you mean broken ribs? 
-A. Broken ribs. Sl)owed a fractured back and its deformity, 
and evidence of old fracture of the right clavicle, right collar 
bone. \Ve got one thing from physical examination, and that. 
is there is a prominence of rig·l1t clavicle at the fracture site 
and pain 011 manipulation of the collar bone when we ex-
amined it. · 
Q. Is it necessary for her to wear any special equipment in 
order to take care of these deformities¥ 
A. Yes, she is wearing at the present time an elevated shoe, 
a specially constructed shoe, which she has on now, and a 
surgical corset for tlrn support of her back. 
Q. Can you say with any certainty when, if at all, she will 
be able to not wear these supports? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. When is the most recent examination that you have 
made of Mrs. Crocker? 
A. I saw her yesterday. 
Q. Did you notice anything that would change what you 
told us as to her condition Y 
A. Her condition is essentially unchanged since the Inst 
examination. 
page 49 ~ Q. I don't recall whether you told us the date 
or not. Was that in May, 1949? 
A. ~fay 27, 1949, I believe. 
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Q. Did I understand you to say her condition is not change~ 
then, as of yesterday 'l . 
A. No, sir, her condition is essentially the same. With Mrs. 
Cracker's permission, she is expecting the first of the year. 
Q. Yes, but I mean I1er condition. 
A. Relative to the injuries, no, sir. 
Q. Now, did you find any evidence of any arthritic condi-
tion as a result of these injuries Y 
A. They described some changes that are shown on an 
X-ray of tbe joint surface of the involved vertebra that would 
represent an arthritis. 
Q. Doct~r, as a result . of your examinations of Mrs. 
Crocker, do ·you take the view that she is permanently in-
jured! · 
.. 
1\Ir. Kuykendall: I object to that question. It's a leading 
question, and the question was asked a while ago also. 
Judge Marshall: Yes, it is leading. Objection sustained. 
Mr. Ker11: I will frame it differently. 
By Mr. Kern: 
Q. What would you say is the result of your examination 
as to the permanency of Mrs. Crocker's injury1 
Mr. Kuykendall: I object to that. 
page 50} Mr. Kern: Nothing leading about that. 
Mr. Kuykendall: What injuries f Doesn't say 
which injuries, if any. 
Judge Marshall: I can't hear you, Mr. ,J{uykendall. 
Mr. Kuykendall: He was asked what his opinion is with 
regard to the permanency of her injuries. '\Vbat injuries'l 
Judge :Marshall: Oh, yes, he must say the injuries 'he's 
been talking about. 
Mr. Kern: Oh, yes. 
By :Mr. Kern: 
Q. Doctor, you have examined :Mrs. Crocker on at least 
these two occasions I have mentioned? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, directing your attention to her injuries which were 
received as a result of this accident based upon the X-rays 
which you viewed, those which you 1md taken, what can vou 
tell us about the permanency of her injuries? ~ 
A. It's a question which, with the permission of the court, 
• 
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is still not correct. It's not the permanency of the injuries, 
it's the residuals of the injuries that are now present. 
Q. I am being corrected by everybody. 
A. The injuries have properly healed but they have healed 
with deformities present. 
Q. State what that is1 
page 51 ~ A. I l1ave alr<'ady stated that there is a curve 
. in the back, the1·e is a change in the posture, 
a change in the gait, deformity of the clavicle associated with 
pain, and the whole body mechanics of walking are altered 
by the change in the curve in the back from what they nor-
mally would be. That's what I meant, the residuals of the 
injuries. They are static at present. 
:Mr. Kern: Your witness. 
Mt. Kuykendall: I think I have no questions. 
(\Vitness excused.) 
:Mr. Benham: Is Dr. Riley out theref 
,vhereupon, 
DR. CHESTER L. RILEY 
was called as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, and having 
been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
DIREC'l1 EXAMINATION. 
By l\f r. Benham: 
Q. Your name, Doctor f 
A. Chester L. Riley. 
Q. "Where are you practicing1 
A. Winchester, Virginia. 
Q. How Ion~ have you bel'n practicing l1erc? 
A. Since 1935. 
Q. ,vere you practicin~ here all that time? 
A. Well, interrupted during the war. "ras away four 
years. 
page 52 ~ Q. \Vhat training- have you had a~ a doctor? 
A. Had general training as a medical doctor and 
specialized training as obstetrician and ~enecologist. 
Q. Where did you lmve your training? In what school or 
l1ospital f 
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A. Medical College of Vii'ginia, largely. Hospitals and 
medical school. 
Q. ,vhere did you have your specialized training as-what 
is it, orthopedic-'# 
A. No, obstetrics. It was at the Medical College of Vir-
ginia in Richmond. 
Q. How long a training did you have 'I 
Q. Well, schooling consisted of pre-med, of course, and 
medical school, interneship. All of it amounted to nine yea1·s. 
Was certified by the American Board of Obstetrics and 
Genecology as a specialist in the specialty. 
Q. You have known the plaintiff, Mrs. CrockerY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long have you known her f 
A. ,:vell, certainly prior to April 2, 1947-1 am not exactly 
sure about the time of her :first visit to see me-dming that 
pregnancy of which I delivered her that time-first time. 
Q. At that time you saw her professionnlly'I 
A. That's true, at the hospital, April 2, 1947. 
page 53 } Q. And what was the nature of what you were 
doing f 01· ber 'I 
A. She had a baby at that time, and I attended her. 
Q. Now, it's been testified here that Mrs. Crocker was in 
an accident on February 4, 1948. Did you see her after that 
accident, and if so, l1ow soon Y 
A. Immediately after the accident, or as soon as she was 
brought into the hospital to the emergency room. 
Q. And tell us what you found when you examined Mrs. 
Crocker after the accident. 
A. I saw her at point of admission, upon the admission to 
the hospital and called the late Dr. P. V\1• Boyd to see lier, 
inasmuch as she l18d evidence of injm-y, manifesting quite 
some shock and a lot of pain at the time, and then requested 
the late Dr. Boyd to see her because of this condition. 
Q. ,:v1iat was the nature of her injuries at that time? 
a. She had intensive injuries. She had multiple ribs frac-
tured-
Q. What is that, broken ribs Y 
A. Yes, broken ribs. 
Q. Do you know how mnnv broken ribs 7 
A. Yes, on tbe right side she had fractures of the first, 
second, third, f ourtb, sixtll and seventh, and on the left she 
had fractures of tl1e second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth and 
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· seventh. That was as reported by the X-ray de-
page 54 ~ partment at tho Winchester Memorial Hospital. 
She also had a compression fracture of. the twe]ftb 
dorsal vertebra reported at that time. 
Q. Any other injuries that she suffered at that time 'I 
A. None that I recall, except just the usual contusions, and 
so forth, bruises. 
Q. How long after the accident was she under your care 'I 
A. Well, she was under my cnre, of course, prior to that 
ns a patient with pregnancy at the time. That, of course, is 
why I was called to see her before her admission, and she was 
continued to be under the care jointly of myself and Dr. P. 
·w. Boyd during her hospitalization and after her discharge 
from the hospital. 
Q. Do you know how long she was in the hospital 'I 
A. Yes, she was discharged from the hospital on the 28th. 
Q. Of what month 7 
A. Of February. 
Q. And then did you prescribe for her after that? 
"A. Yes, she went home, and of course we had her hospi-
talized at home-wasn't hospitalized, nt least we had lter in 
a state of' hospital treatment. We had n hospital bed there, 
and we had her under the care of nurses in the home, and I 
went down to see her there just as a routine follow•up at 
that time. Then, of course1 later on she came back to the hospital and delivered May the 5th. 
Q. Can you state whetl10r or not this hospitaliza-
pnge 55 ~ tion was necessary because of this injury she re-
ceived in this nceidenU · 
A. Yes, definite]y she was hospitalized because of the acci-
dent. 
Q. And when you sny "a nurse", you mean a registered 
nurse at the hospita]. 
A. You mean at home? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Yes, she had a nurse there at home, a registered nurse. 
Q. Was there anything unusual about the pregnancy? Did 
she have a normal pregnancy? Had you expected any trouble 
on account of her pregnancy before the acmdent? 
A. As a result of the accidenU 
Q. No, before the accident was there any unusual condition 
about her pregnancy? 
A. About her condition Y No, not tliat I recall. She was 
progressing normally. 
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. Q. Were there any other results ·of this aceident to her 
pl1ysical condition that you can recall? 
A. '\Vas there whaU 
Q. Did this accident produce any other effects upon her 
body or nerves besides the ones you have already described 'l 
:Mr. Kuykendall: If t11e conrt please, the witness has been 
asked and already stated what his findings were. He was 
· · aeked to state wliat his findings were, and he has. 
page 56 ~ · Judge Marshall: You asked if there are any 
other findings Y Objection overruled. 
l\fr. Kuykendall: Exception noted. 
The Witness: :May I have the question again 'l 
By :Mr. Benham: 
· Q. Were there any otbcr results of the injuries from the 
accident other than those you have already explained to the 
jury! 
A. There was none, except the patient had after the acci-
dent uterine contractions, which indicate to me primarily as 
an obstetrician threatened abortion-miscarriage. She had 
contractions for the better part of the next day and a half or 
two days, very strong contractions requiring frequent hypo-
dermics of different types of medication to stop this activity. 
As far as orthopedic standpoint, of course, I don't know about 
the intricacies of that. I am not qualified. 
Q. You say Dr. Boyd also treated bed Is Dr. Boyd lhr-
ingf 
A. Tbe late Dr. Boyd. Dr. P. '\V. Boyd. 
Q. Is he dead nowt 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Will you state wl1ether or not from tI1e type of injuries 
Mrs. Crocker suffered that sl1e suffered any pain Y 
A. Oh, yes, she lmd extreme pain for a good many days-
wel1, I'll say weeks. Even after she went I1ome that was a 
quite great concern to us at home. She bad a lot of pain then, 
wbicl1 necessitated bed care, largely tl1e painful 
page 57 ~ movement of the extremities. 
Q. '\Vllen did yon last see Mrs. Crocker! 
A. I saw her last week. 
Q. And did you see her yesterday! 
A. She was I1ere for just a routine examination because of 
the pregnancy at this time. 
Q. Can you state wl1ether or not there are any difficulties 
from the accident in the present pregnancy 'l 
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i\Ir. Kuydendall: I object to that. There is no averment . 
at all about any such injury or present disability because of 
that. 
Mr. Benham: ,v e say there is permanent disability, and' 
under that we are entitled to show any future disability. 
Mr. Kuykendall: I'd like to be heard 011 that. 
Judge Marshall: No bill of particulars prayed for, is 
thereY 
1\Ir. Benham: No. 
Judge Marshall: Gentlem<'n of the jury, just remain in the 
box, the witness remain on the stand. 
CWhe1·eupon, the court and counsel retired to chambers, 
where the following discussion was had:) 
lir. Benham: If Your Honor please, we allege that she 
was permanently injured in the bill of complaint. No bill of 
particulars was required. W c arc therefore entitled to show 
any permanent injury1 any effect that that accident has on her at this hme or in the future. This is one of the 
page 58 ~ effects we can show, that she can't do her work or 
she can't live normally, or anything that affects 
her permanently. We say she continues to suffer great pain, 
both mental and physical, and on beyond we say, "For all of 
this plaintiff suffered injuries both temporary and perma-
nent." ,v e are trying to show her permanent injury that 
she suffered now and any in the future. If they bad wanted 
a bill of particulars as to just what those injuries were, they 
could have asked for it. · 
Judge Marshall: ,vhat is this man going to say? 
:Mr: Benham: He says it has made it difficult for her to 
bear children. She is entitled to bear children. Any normal 
person is. 
Judge Marshall: You don't have to argue that. 
·why is it objectionable 1 
Mr. Kuykenda1l: It says she "suffered severe bodily in-
juries, to-wit: severe injuries to her body, including thirteen 
broken ribs, compressed vertebra in h<'r back, punctured lung, 
broken co11ar bone, cuts, bruises, pain, ahrac;ions and injuries 
to ber extremities and to other parb, of her body. She was 
required to undergo protracted medical care C'onsisting of 
twenty-five days in the ,vinchester l\fomorial Hospital ancl 
approximately three months' care nt home under the super-
vision of a reg-istered nnrse. In addition to the above, the 
undersigned, who was pregnant at said tim<', suffered severe 
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sl1ock to her nervous system, and continues to suf-
page 59 } fer great pain, both mental and physical, as a re-
sult of the injuries above referred to. All of which 
caused plaintiff to spend large sums of money, to-wit: 
$3,000.00, and to become liable for other large sums of money 
in an attempt to cure herself of the injuries of which she was 
and is and will be suffering. For all of which plaintiff suf-
fered injuries, both temporary and permanent, because of 
which and because of the mental and physical pain, anguish 
and the sl1ock to her system, temporary and permanent, 
plaintiff claims damages in the sum of $25,000." 
page 60} Judge Marshall: She is saying that this is a 
result of a permanent injury. 
Mr. Kuykendall: They haven't shown that. 
.Judge Marshall: That's what he asked him. 
Mr. Kuykendall: They can't show it. They can't come in 
and show that an afte1·-effcct was a disability, not lmving 
charged that she wns going to bear a child, or anything else, 
aud that she was therefore entitled to damages. 
Judge Marshall: If they plead disability resulting from 
the injury, it mny be the nature of a disability resulting from 
the injury, but isn't she entitled to recover for that? 
:i\Ir. Kuykendall : I don't think she is entitled to sbow now 
that she liad some injury that may have prevented her from 
having normal childbirth. 
:i\Ir. Benham: ,ve are not showin~ permanent injury, we 
are showing the permanent effect of it. 
,Judge l\Inrshnll: Instead of "injury" why dicln 't you say 
''disability"? What do yon say about disability in that? 
. l\Ir. Kuykendall: Dicln 't say an~·thing. . 
l\fr. Benham : ,v e say she has suffered these injuries and 
because of the mental nnd physical anguish and shock to her 
system, temporary and permanent-now I say that we have 
proved tbat she has a curvature of the spine as a result of tbc 
accident. ,v e have proved that she-
page 61 } ,Judge Marshall: Can't walk very well. He 
dicln 't object to that. That's a disability. 
Mr. Benham: That's a result. 
,Judge Marshall: That's a disability, too. 
l\fr. Benham: Disability produced by permanent injury. 
:Mr. Kuykendall: You lmvcn't c1mrged that. 
,T udge Marshall: '\Vh~r don't you object to showing that 
she couldn't walk very well? 
l\Ir. Kuykendall: I don't object to that .. 
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Judge Marshall: It's a disability. If she has a disability 
why can't she show it f 
Mr. Kuykendall: Because they haven't charged any perma-
nent disability. They said the injuries were of a permanent 
nature. They have not charged that there is any disability 
from them or that the disability is permanent. . 
Judge Marshall: I don't know whether you use·the term 
"injury" to include not being able to walk very well or not. 
I 'cl say an injury is where you cut your leg, and if you can't 
walk because you cut a tendon, makes you limp, tllat's a dis-
ability. It's a result of the injury. They don't say anytl1ing 
in there about any disability. This is talking nbout the diffi-
culty of bearing a child. It would certainly be a disability. 
It wouldn't be an injury. 
l\fr. Benbam: It's a result of an injury. 
Judge l\farshall: It's a disability. 
page 62 ~ Mr. Kern: ,v e don't have to use the worcl '' dis-
figurement'' but she is disfigured, because she 
limps. 
Judge Marshall: You are entitled to recover damages for 
the injury, but then in addition to the injury, if the injury 
produces a disability, you are entitled to recover something 
else for that. 
l\fr. Benham: ,v e say that we are injured permanently • 
• Judge l\Iarshall: Suppose she is injured permanently. In 
other words, your argument is that tbe term "injury" in-
cludes disability. 
l\Ir. Benham: Tbev are entitled to anv results of the in-
jury. If you say "injury" you can prove an~·tbing that in-
jury produces. 
,Judge Marshall: Anyway, it used to be common law. 
Mr. Benham: All we nrc required to do.~ on the numerous 
cases, is to give them fair warning of wlmt we are trying·to 
prove. That's the effect of a notice of motion. ,ve are try-
in~ to show them the kincl of a facts we are trying to prove. 
·we have done that. If they wanted a bill of particulars they 
could have asked for it. 
llr. Kuykendall: We didn't ask for it, they particularized 
it . 
• Judge Marshall: What do you say about that? 
1\fr. Kuykendall: :My argument is this: Suppose·they do 
prove it. If tl1ey want to come in and s11ow sl1e can't perform 
a normal function in life, they should show tllat as 
page 63 ~ a disability claimed to have been suffered. We 
don't have to ask for a bill of particulars, and what 
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is more, they have got to charge that. It's a result of some-
thing they claim happened. 
Judge Marshall: What you say is at least have got to 
give you some notice of things. Notice of motion for judg-
ment doesn't do away altogether with telling tbe other man 
what yon are going to sue him for. 
You don't allege any disability. 
Mr. Benham: Not in that word. We allege them in effect. 
Judge Marshall: I think injury is different from disability, 
if you are going to use the word. 
You s~e, ·here is the difficulty about it. You tell tl1em she 
was injured and vou tell him she had broken ribs and bad 
ber back l>r'ok~n. ·suppose Mr. Kuykendall would say, "'Vell, 
truly, it never occurred to me that it might affect her child-
bearing capacity. 
Mr. Kern: How could we know until she had another child 
to set it out. 
Judge Marshall: ,ven, maybe not, I don't know tbat. Of 
course, you could always amend. But he can say, "That's an 
awful thing, the jury would give her maybe $10,000, something 
like that. It's an awful thing, and I am not prepared for it. 
It's something that I wouldn't reasonably have anticipated 
from this pleading." And maybe if you had just saicl ''gen-
eral disability" it wouldn't be enough. Of course, if you 
say "gener~l disabilities", if a man cut his leg 
page 64 ~ off, obviously yon could anticipate any normal dis-
abilities. 
:Mr. Benham: I would think from "injuries" it could be 
general disabilities . 
• Judge :Marshall: There is where you and I differ. I don't 
think so. I tllink you have got to tell them not only tlle in-
juries but that they are ah:;o disabled, because sometimes in-
juries don't result in any disabilities. Certainly, sometimes 
even though there is a temporary disability, there is not a 
permanent disability. Yon bave to tell them that there is 
some permanent disability, or else he'd I1ave to gain it from 
looking at her. He'd have to certainly suspect tlmt, reading 
that thing over. It may not occur to him that tile woman would 
I1ave any difficulty bearing children. 
Mr. Benham: I think tllere is a clisability. There was no 
request for particulars. Yon don't I1avc to tell every dis-
ability. , 
Judge :Marshall: He'd say you lulled him into a sense of 
security. Of course, tbey are going to ask for disabilities, and 
the woman has got this sway and won't walk very weII. He 
Julian D. Steele v. :Mary Steele Crocker 
Dr. Chester L. Riley. 
41 
will know that, but it not have occurred to him that you 
would come in with something about childbirth. 
Mr. Benham: Let's put it this way. You admit you arc 
trying to make a distinction between disabilities and injuries 
by saying injuries he knows that there are going 
page 65 } to be some disabi1ities. 
Judge :Marshall: Yes. 
Mr. Benham: All right, so suppose we just state "disa-
bilities." Are you going to rule then that we'd have to 
specify each one if he clidn 't ask for a bill of particulars ·l 
Judge Marshall: I don't know. l\Iost common. law I think 
you'd have to, but I don't know about that. If you had said 
"disabilities", then you'd say, "Why doesn't he come in and 
sav ''Vhat disabilities?' " 
~Ir. Benham: You mean if we had just said "permanent 
disabilities" T 
Judge :Marshall: If you hncl said "permanent disabilities", 
maybe you would have to ask for a bill of particulars. 
Mr. Benham: Then you have already said that ''injuries" 
would put 11im on notice. 
Judge :Marshall: I said maybe. It is an informal plea. 
Here is what I think the sensible rule is: if it looks like he 
might be taken by surprise. 
Mr. Benham: I think you are right, but I don't think in 
this case. 
Judge ~Iarshall: I don't know the facts of the case, but I 
think you will have to amend it. · 
Mr. Benham: Is tliat your rulingf 
.J uclge Marshall: Yes. 
:Mr. Benham: ,ve have no objection to putting an amend-
ment in there now. 
page 66 } Judge 'i\Iarshall: All right, 1mt it in. 
)Ir. Kuykendall: I will have to ask for a con-
tinuance. 
Judge Marshall: ,ve will hear you on that after l1e puts it 
in. 
l\Ir. Kem: ,v e except to the ruling of the court. 
:?\[ r. Benham: I don't think it's important enough for us. 
to trv another case on. 
Judge :Marshall: I will imstain the objection and excep-
tion noted. 
('Vhereupon, the court and counsel returned to the court-
room.) 
l\Ir. Benham: That's all. 
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CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Kuykendall: 
Q. Dr. Riley, had Mrs. Crocker been to see you the day of 
this accident before the accident! 
A. I don't think so. I don't recall that she was. As I 
recall, the accident was in the early part of the day. 
Q. You don't have your record with you from which you 
could determine thaU 
A. I could find out wbether or not sbe lmd made an office 
<>all that dav. That could be determined without anv trouble. 
We have a· record in the office if she had made a 'pre-natal 
visit that day. 
"Mr. Kuykendall: I think that's all. 
Mr. Kern: Does tile court want to have a recess nowt 
Judge Marshall: Yes, I tbink we will recess at 
page 67 ~ this time. 
('Whereupon, after proper cautioning of the jury, a short 
recess was taken.) 
Mr. Kern: Mrs. Steele, please. 
Whereupon, 
:MRS. JULIAN STEELE 
was called as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, and having 
been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Kern: 
Q. You are Mrs. Julian D. Steele! 
A. Yes. 
Q. The mother of Ma 1·y Steele Crocker! 
A. Yes. 
Q. And tbe wife of Julian D. Steele? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You live at Stephens City! 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where were you 1·iding in your husband's car when this 
accident occurred Y 
A. I was riding back of Mr. Steele. He was driving, and 
J was riding back of him. 
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Q. Did you see anything of what happened 7 
page 68} A. No. 
Q. Let me ask you this: After your ~aughter 
was injured was it necessary for her to come to your home 
for care7 
A. Yes. 
Q. How long was your daughter at your home under the 
care of a registered nurse, if she was? 
A. I can't remember that exactly. A couple of months. 
Q. Was she in any pain when she was there7 
A. Oh, my, yes. 
Q. For how long did that contiuue9 ·was it sporadic, or 
all the time f 
A. '\Voll, it seemed to be practically all the time. We were 
verv worried for a while. Q. Did your daughter pay you anything for her board? 
A. Oh, yes, she paid. 
Q. Do you recall the aggregate figure, how much it was 9 
A. $300. 
:Mr. Kern: Your witness. 
Mr. Kuykendall: If the court please~ I move to exclude 
this testimony about payment for board and room there. 
There is no averment of any payment of such a character or 
any debt incurred. 
)fr. Kern: If the court please, if l\lr. Kuykendall wants 
to exclude that, we had better go into the chambers. 
(Whereupon, the .court and counsel retired to 
page 69 } chambers, where the following discussion was had.) 
:Mr. Benham: "-which caused plaintiff to spend large 
sums of money.'' 
Mr. Kuykendall: For wl1at? 
Mr. Benham: That's what she was paying it for. 
~Ir. Kern: She would have had to pav it wherever Rhe was. 
There is no difference. She has got to pav so much a day 
at the hospital. We have got bills wlucli show what she 
paid. At home she was under the care of a registered nurse. 
It'~ exactly the same thing. You are very late making the 
pomt. 
Mr. Kuykendall:- I have made my point, so that's that. 
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Judge Marshall: ·what docs it say, "in and about en-
deavoring to be cured" Y 
Mr. Kern: "-all of which caused plaintiff to svend large 
sums of money ($3,000) and has berome liable for other sums 
of money, in an attempt to cure herself of the injuries of 
which she was and is and will be suff.ering." 
Judge l\:larshall: How about when you go to the hospital t 
You have got to deduct what your ordinary board and room 
would be elsewhere. 
Mr. Benham: You can prove that the lmsband went 011 
Jiving at-the same place as if she had gone back there to live. 
Judge .:Marshall: I am against you on this problem bere, 
because I think it would be competent to show that she paid so 
much a day at the hospital. I don't see why it 
page 70 ~ wouldn't be competent if it was her mother. Sup-
posing it was a nursing home! But, of course, sbe 
had to eat and sleep somewl1ere. 
Mr. Benham: She had a home that she could have gone to, 
but she couldn't bcrause of her injuries. 
Judge Marshall: This is just for board and lodging. This 
isn't for care and attention. 
Mr. Benham: She could have gone to her home if it lmdn 't 
been fo1· the accident. 
Judge Marshall: Of course, I never heard any question 
raised before, but I wonder what they'd say about board in a 
hospital. Is there any special board you lmve to have Y It 
would be more board than you would have to pay anywhere 
else. 
l\Ir. Kern: As I understand, so much a day includes board. 
Judge Marshall: I never heard it mised, but I expect you 
would find that vou would have to deduct what vou ,vould 
have to pay for board and room ordinai·ily. · 
Mr. Benham: If you had a regular board, yes. 
Judge :Marshall: Or else you wonld have to deduct some-
thing for what yon would eat at home, because you are eating 
something. 
Mr. Kern: You arc splitting hairs tllerc. 
J'udge MarsI1all: Yes, you n re splitting hairs. 
Mr. Kuykendall: I am raising the question that th~v have 
never cha rgecl any such item. • 
Judge Marshall: I am saying tllis is for extraordinary 
kind of bom·cl and room. 
page 71 } l\Ir. Kuykendall: Secondly, it's the parent. No 
legal obligation to pay the parents. . 
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1Ir. Benham: Tl1e parent had no legal obligation to sup-
port her. That is, if she came there as a visitor, it's ono 
thing, but if somebody comes there and parks as a permanent 
proposition, the courts have held that it's an implied con-
tract. 
Mr. 'Whiting: But she contfoued to stay there and have 
the baby. 
Judge Marshall: ·w11at she says is that she paid board and 
room $300. Of course, she ifm 't entitled to board and room 
othe1~ than the board and 1·oom that she would have J1ad to 
pay over and above the board and room that she ordinarily 
expected to pay. 
:\Ir, Benham: "re will show sl1e had a room at home she 
could have occupied if it hadn't been for the accident. 
Judge Marshall: ,vell, you would have to deduct the food, 
wl1at her husband would have had to pay. That would he 
the rule. 'When they use the term ''board and room", though, 
it makes it questionable. You would have to go into that and 
show-
:Mr. Benham: -show why sl1e was there. The doctor al-
ready stated that he hospitalized her up there. . 
Judge Marshall: You would have to tie it up that it's ex-
traordinary board and room resulting proximately from the 
accident. 
page 72} 
l\Ir. Kuykendall: Exception noted. 
Judge l\forslmll: Exception noted. 
(Whereupon, the court and counsel returned to the court-
room.) 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Kuykendall: 
Q. :Mrs. Steele, when did your daughter come to your bomeY 
A. She left the hospital and they brought her home. . 
Q. I mean before the ar.cidout when dicl she come to your 
home. How long before the accident clid she come to your 
home1 
A. I can't remember. 
Q. She came tlrnro to visit? 
A. Yes, she was thero with her little baby. 
Q. And she was expecting another child, I understand. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And who was l1e1· cloctor1 
A. Dr. Riley and Dr. Boyd. 
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Q. ,v as Dr. Riley attending her in connection with her ex-
pectancy of the child f 
A. Yes, he always has been. 
Q. And do you remember about how long before the ncci-
uent she came to your home Y 
A. Oh, my memory plavs me tricks. No, I can't remember 
how long. It seems to me some time. 
Q. About how long1 
A. Let me think a minute. She comes and goes---comes to 
see the doctor so often that I just can't 1·emember 
page 73 } at that time. It must have been a couple of weeks. 
Q. And she was planning to stay until the child 
was born! 
A. Yes, I think she was expecting to stay until the child 
was born. She was there when the other child was born. 
Q. Kow., she was just visiting in ~-our home, was she? 
A. Yes, he came-she just comes to visit, of course, be-
cause she is closer to the doctor. 
Q. Now, do you remember coming to ,vinchester on the 
day of this accident 1 
A. Oh, yes, I remember eoming. 
Q. ,vhy did you come to Winchester? 
A. ,vell, sl1e brought this child to Dr. Gibson for shot~. 
Q. And is that why you C'ame to town 7 
A. That's why we came to town. 
Q. To take her and the child to Dr. Gibson? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you ,vere returning home after visiting Dr. Gibson Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. ,vhen this accident occurred~ is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you ,vere riding on the back seat? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And who was riding on the front seat? 
A. She and her father. He went to Gibson's office to get 
l1er and the baby, so I just got in the back with the 
page 74 } groceries. 
Q. And l\lrs. Crocker was riding on the front 
seat heside of her father? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You were not expecting, of course, to charge Mrs. 
Crocker for board and room while she was visiting in your 
home? 
A. Oh, no. No, I lmve the teachers boarding with me, and 
one of them left and she hnd to have the room. 
Julian D. Steele v. Mary Steele Crocker 
Mrs. Julian Steele. 
47 
Q. Mrs. Steele, did I understand,that you do not recall how 
the accident occurred Y 
A. No, things like that l1appen so quickly, I do not recall. 
I didn't see the car strike us. I didn't see it afterwai:ds. 
Of course, I was too dazed afterwards. · 
Q. Do you 1·emember when you got to Bartonsville'/ Do 
you recall that 7 
A. Yes, I recall that, because-
Q. Do you recall passing these snow plows 2 
A. I know we passed them, because in going up the hill I 
cou1cl see the snow plows in front of us. Uf course, Mr. Steele 
didn't obstruct my view then, of course. 
Q. And you saw him pull over to the left to pass these snow 
plows7 
A. Yes, I saw them. I know we pulled over to the left, be-
cause the snow plows were going very slowly. 
Q. And you saw the three snow plows? 
page 75 } A. Yes, I think there was three. 
Q. Do you know on which side of the road Mr. 
Steele's car was travelling when it passed the last snow plow? 
A. No, I don't know where it passed the last snow plow, 
and I don't know how far we were in the road. 
Q. Do you know whether it was snowing at the time? 
A. I don't think it ~was snowing. 
Q. ,vas the road slippery'/ 
A. ,v en, we hadn't thought it was slippery until we slipped 
on the ice. I suppose we slipped on ice. 
Q. vVas there snow on tlie road? 
A. Yes, there was snow in patches on the road. 
Q. l\fr. Steele started to pass tl1e snow plows right at the 
foot of the hill at Bartonsville, didn't he? 
A. Yes, I think so. 
Q. And continued moving over toward the left-hand side of 
the road as he passed each snow plow, isn't that true'/ 
A. Well, I couldn't say that, but I think l1e was. 
Q. l\frs. Steele, are you able to judge the speed, or were 
you able to judge the speed at which l\Ir. Steele was travel-
ling when he passed the snow plows f 
A. No, I wouldn't know. 
l\Ir. Kuykendall: I think tbnt's all. 
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RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Kern: 
page 76 ~ Q. You say you got in with the groceries. 'Whose 
groceries were they1 
A. They were my groceries. 
Mr. Kern:· That's all. 
(Witness ;excused.) 
'\Vhereupon,, 
MARY STEELE CROCKER 
was called as a witness on her own behalf, and having been 
first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXA1'UNATI0N. 
By Mr. Kern: . 
Q. You are Mary Steele Crocker, the plaintiff, are yon 
notf 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How old are you 1 
A. Thirty-three. 
Q. Now, you were in your father's car on this occmdon we 
have been discussing here? Do you remember anything about 
what happened? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you know it was snowing f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you all have on the chains, or not 1 
A. No, sir. . 
Q. What is the first tbing that you remember 
page 77 } when you first came to Y Where were yon f 
A. Sitting in the snow. 
Q. At the scene of the accidenU 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I assume you were brougllt to the hospital. Do yon 
know the injuries you were suffering from at that timef Will 
you tell the jury what thev were'l 
A. You mean the pain Y • 
Q. No, what was broken, if anything. '\Vhat bappenecl. 
A. After the X-rays were taken 7 
Julian D. Steele v. :Mary Steele Crocker 
Mary Steele Crocker. 
49 
Q. Yes, after you found out what injuries you had suf-
fered, what were they 'l 
A. I had thirteen ribs broken, compressed vertebra, punc-
. tured lung, broken collar bone. 
Q. Did you have any cuts and bruises on your legs or arms 
or your body'/ . 
A. Yes, all over my hips and my knees. 
Q. Did you suffer any pain at that time or later? 
A. All the time. 
Q. How long were you in ,vinchester :Memorial Hospital? 
A. Twenty-five days. 
Q. And then where did you go 1 
A. :My mother's home. 
Q. ,vhat attention and care did you have at your mother's 
home! 
page 78 ~ A. I had a registered nurse. 
Q. How long was she with you 1 
A. Three months.· 
Q. Now, since that time has it been necessary for you to 
wear any artificial aids 7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What are they'/ 
A. I wear an orthopedic brace for my back. 
Q. ,v1mt type of an item is that? ·what does it look like? 
"
7hat purpose does it serve 'l 
A. It's support for my. back. It looks like a sort of-it's 
a brace. 
Q. ·what's the size of iU 
A. It covers from my shoulders practically half-way down 
to my knees. 
Q. \Vhat is it made off 
A. Cloth and steel. 
Q. Anything else that you wead 
A. I wear a built-up shoe. · 
Q. Do you have the shoe on now 1 
A. Yes, sir. Right foot. 
Q. For how long have you been wearing a built-up shoe 1 
A. Three weeks. 
Q. Do you find that it affects your walk in any way? 
A. Oh., yes. 
page 79 ~ Q. Do you limp 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. This brace for your back, when did you first start wear-
ing it, just approximately? 
A. Six months, I think. 
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Q. Do you find that it helps you any! 
A. Oh, yes. 
Q. When you don't wear the brace, what effect, if any, cloes 
the lack of the brace have on you Y 
A. I get very tired and it is very painful to w!llk. 
Q. Are you wearing the brace at the present tune? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. After you have been without the brace-has there been 
any period when you have not worn the braceY 
A. On the advice of Dr. Riley, I haven't worn it for the 
last two months. 
Q. ·what do you notice about your condition when you don't 
wear iU 
A. \Yhen I am lying down I have trouble getting np or 
moving my limbs at all. 
Q. Do you experience any pain? 
A. Oh, yes, great pain. That's why I can't move. 
Q. Is that continuous? Do you have that all the time? 
A. Always when I am lying down and try to move my hips. 
Q. Since this accident have you been able to 
page 80 } carry on your duties as housewife and do your 
work and what not at home? 
A. Oh, no, I can't do any lifting, and this brace is very 
detrimental in the fact I can't bend over. 
Q. It restricts you so thnt you can't bend Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. Have you lm<l any help there at homeY 
A. I have had help ever since I hacl the baby-had the last. 
Q. 'Who have you had employed helping you at homeY 
A. I have had four or five girls. 
Q. Just in the interest of saving time I want to mention 
some of these items to you and have you identify them, if you 
will. Is this a memorandum prepared by you 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
!Ir. Kuykendall: Of course, I will have to object on each. 
By l\h-. Kern: 
Q. This shows an aggregate of $3,488.11. The first item 
is $440.95 in the " 7inchester :Memorial Hospital. Is that an 
account that has been paid to the hospital 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Does that include any charges made for having your 
baby there7 
A. No, sir. 
Julian D. Steele v. Mary Steele Crocker 
lrlary St~ek Crocker. 
51 
Q. That's all been eliminated from this f 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 81 } Q. This was.all a result of your injuriesJ is that 
correct! 
A. Yes. 
Q. The next is Hopemont Sanitarium, $10.00. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Kuykendall: What is that fol'i 
The Witness: X-rays. 
By Ur. Kern: 
Q. Where is Hopemont Sanitarium? 
., . 
A. It's near my home in Oakland, :Maryland. 
Q. Omps Ambulance Service, $15.00. Has that been paid Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. ,vhat is that for? 
A. ,vhen I was discharged from tlie hospital I was brought 
home in the ambulance, and before tlie baby was delivered I 
bad to be taken back in an ambulance to the hospital. 
Q. The next item is medicine, $12.30. Is that drug store 
medicine? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Has that been paid? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Sears, Roebuck and Company, $53.06. 
A. That is for hospital bed. 
Q. And that's been paid? 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 82} Q. George ,v. Kurtz, $39.50. 
A. That was the mattress. 
Q. Special hospital mattress for the hospital bed? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Next item, Mrs. Evelyn Cadwallader, Registered Nurse, 
ten weeks, $562. Has that been paid? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Is that the registered nurse that you l1ad with you when 
vou left tlie hospital 1 
· A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The next item is Mrs. Mollie E. Hildebrand, $114. Ras 
that been paid T 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What was her connection? 
A. The nurse I had wben I was in the hospital. 
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Q. Dr. P. ,v. Boyd, $75. Was that for his administration 
and attention to you at the hospital i 
A. Yes. 
Q. Dr. Gibson, $10. 
A. That was for attending the baby. 
}fr. Kuykendall: I object to that. Of course, there may 
be other items. I would like to consider this list later. There 
is no definite association of any of these items with these 
injuries. 
· Judge Marshall: ,vhat is the relevancy of what 
page 83 -~ is paid for the baby • 
. · :Mr. Kern: I have already eliminated the baby 
from the hospital charge. I think I can bring out that that 
was a fee paid to Dr. Gibson~ even though he is a baby doctor, 
in connection with her injuries, _and I think I should be al-
lowed to develop that. If it isn't, I will strike it. 
Judge Marshall: Ask her. 
By Mr. Kern: 
Q. Mrs. Crocker, did this $10 have to do with your injuries 
in the automobile accident, or was that for normal charge! 
. A. After the baby was delivered, after the accident, I 
couldn~t do any lifting. Dr. Boyd and Dr. Riley both advised 
me to do no lifting, and I had to leave the baby in the hospital. 
Q.-Wbat did Dr. Gibson charge this $10 for7 
A. He attended the baby while it was in the hospital. 
lfr. Kern: That explains it, I think. She wasn't allowed 
to take the baby, had to leave the baby in the hospital, and 
this was a $10 fee to Dr. Gibson for taking care of the baby. 
Because of the inju17. she conldn 't take the baby with her. 
It's only $10. I will strike it. Go on, forget that. 
By Mr. Kern: 
Q. Dr. T. H. Lusby, $6. 
A. That was over in Maryland. 
Q. Was that a doctor that attended yonf 
page 84 } A. Yes. 
Q. Did he atte~d you as n result of this accident, 
you mean? 
A. Yes, sir.· 
Q. Dr. B. S. Bennett, $18.00, 
A. He is attending me now. 
Q. As a result of the accident T 
. 
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A. That's right. 
. Q. :Mrs. Barbara l\Iontgomcry, February 19 to }.fay 12, 
1948, $300. Who is Mrs. Barbara :Montgomery 1 
A. She took care of my daughter while I was in the hos-
pital and while I was over at my mother's home. 
Q. You weren't able to do that and you had to pay her to 
do that, is that correcU 
A. Yes. 
Q. l\Irs. Allite Luchs., Spencer support, $54.85. Is that the 
brace you are speaking of you wear for your back1 
A. Yes. 
Q. Franz Richey, corrective shoes, $17.95. Are those the 
shoes you liad built up as a result of the accidenU 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. :Miss Josephine Stephens, November 28 to October 2, 
$960. ·who was Miss Josephine Stephens and wlmt is her 
connection 1 
A. She is the girl that I hired to work for me during that 
period of time. 
page 85 ~ Q. In your home? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. She was doing the work that you would do except for 
the injuries, is tlmt correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. )Iiss Helen Bowser, June, 1948, $40. 
A. She worked for me. 
Q. Doing that same type of world 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. :Mrs. Lillian Houser, July and August. 
A. That's the same. 
Q. )!rs. Ruth Deal, September and October, 1948, $80. 
A. Domestic help. 
Q. Clothing, damaged fm· cont, $250; other clothes, $59.50, 
total, $309.50. '\Vere those clothes you had on that were ruined 
as a result of the acciclentl 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now~ on each of these items tllat I hnve read has the 
expenditure been necessitated by the accident, because of the 
injuries you received 7 
:Mr. Kuykendall: I ohjeet to the leading question. 
,J ude:e :Marsliall : Objection overruled. 
lfr.' K uvkendall: Exception not<>d. 
Judge ~farshall: Exception noted. 
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By Mr. Kern: 
Q. Just answer. 
page 86 } A. Yes, they were, $3,488.11. · 
Q. Does your mother take in school teachers and 
boarders up there nt home Y · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did she have some at the time you were there after this 
accident7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. It was necessary for one of them to go as a result of 
your coming there after the accident 1 · 
Mr. Kuykendall: I object to that. 
Judge :Marshall: On what grounds? 
Mr. Kuykendall: It has not been averred as an element of 
damage in this case. 
Mr. Kern: I am explaining why she was there in her 
mother's home. 
Judge :Marshall: He is attempting to tie up this other 
point. Is that wlmt you are trying to dot 
:Mr. Kern: Yes, sir, tl1at's what I am after. 
Mr. Kuykendall: I object to it on the ground it is irrele-
vant and immaterial. 
.Judg-e Marshall: Objection is overruled. 
Mr. Kuyclendall: Exception noted. 
Judge Marshall: Exception noted. 
BY Mr. Kern: 
'Q. Did you occupy a room tl1ere at your mother's? 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 87 } Q. And was it necessary for one of the boarders 
to leave so you could liave the room Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. I understand from your motlier tliat you paid her $300 
for your room and board, is that conecU 
A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Kuykendall: I object to that and move to exclude it . 
• Judge :Ma~·shall: On what ground? 
Mr. Kuykendall: On the ground that she was there visit-
ing and they would not have made any charge for her hoard 
and room except for this accident. Mrs. Steele testified to 
that. 
Mr. Kern: I was going to ask if she had any special food, 
and what not. I don't know. 
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Judge Marshall : Objection is overruled. 
Mr. Kuykendall: Exception noted. 
Judge Marshall: Exception. 
By Mr. Kern: 
Q. ·was it.necessary for you to have special foodr 
Mr. Kuykendall: I object to that leading· question. 
Judge Marshall: Sustained. 
By Mr. Kern: 
Q. Did you have the same food the other people had Y 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you have the same care? 
page 88 ~ A. No, sir. 
Q. ,v1iat care did you have that was differenU 
A. I was flat on my back. 
Q. Was it possible for you to go to tl1e table and eat with 
the other people? Or did you have to be served in your room? 
A. I couldn't move off the bed. 
Q. How long were you in that condition Y About how long! 
A. Until about two weeks before I went to the hospital they 
let me up in a wheel chair. 
Q. You .mean wl1en you went to the hospital to have the 
baby7 When was that, in May! 
A. In May. . 
Q. That would be from February until May! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. All your meals had to be carried to you Y 
A. Yes, sir. i, 
Mr. Kern: Your witness. 
We have got receipts for all these items listed. We don't 
want to introduce them. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Kuykendall: 
Q. This item here listed as Josephine Stephens, what was 
that for? 
A. Domestic help in the home. 
page 89 } Q. In vour home in Cumberland? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And that was for what period of time Y 
A. I was living in Oakland, Maryland at the time of the 
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accident, and in November we moved to Cumberland, and I 
l1ad her from that November up until just recently. 
Q. ·what was she employed to doi \Vhat was the nature 
of her employment i 
A. To live at our home and did all the lifting and all the 
housework. 
Q. She was a house servant there Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Ruth Deal, what was she employed for? 
A. For the same purpose. That was when I was in Oakland. 
Q. And she was employed as a l1ouse servant 7 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. And Lillian Houser? 
A. That is ·a llouse servant. 
Q. Heleri Bowser t 
A. As a house servant. 
Q. They were all employed to work in your homef 
A. Yes., sir. 
Q. When did you go to yoUl' home after the baby was born r 
A. The first or second week in J unc. 
Q. Mrs. Barbara :Montgomery, what was she employed for l 
A. She took care of my baby. 
page 90 } Q. At yom· mother's home! 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And she was employed only foi· that purpose f 
A. Yes~ sir. 
Q. Did you mean the little girl T Yon had a little girl, or 
little boy the first time'? 
A. Little girl. The one that was in the accident. 
Q. ,v as she employed to take care of hed 
A. Yes., sir. 
Q. :Mrs. :Mollie E. Hildebrand, what was she employed for 'l 
A. Nurse I bad in the hospital. 
Q. And ~frs. Cadwallader 1 
A. The nurse I had while I was at home. 
Q. ,vhile you were at your mother's home 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, Mrs. Crocker, who has paid these billsf 
A. My husband. 
:Mr. Benham: It please! tlie court, ,ve would like to con-ect 
one statement Jmre. ,ve thought we hnd eliminated from the 
hospital bill all children's expenses. i\[r. Kern was rending 
from the wrong figure. It should be $347.95 instead of 
$440.95. ·we m·c only asking the hospital bill for $347.95. 
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By Mr. Kuykendall: 
Q. Now, Mr~ Crocker, I believe you had gone 
page 91 } to the home of your mother and father to visit 
there for a while, had you not, before the accident Y 
A. Yes~ sir. 
Q. And do you recall when you went tberef 
A. If I tell you the nature of my visit would that be a help? 
Q. I mean just the approximate day. H;ow long were you 
there before that f 
A. Several months. 
Q. Several montbs'l Did I understand you correctly'l 
A. 'Yes~ sir. 
Q. ,v ere you planning to stay there until your child was 
born'l · 
A. No, sir. 
Q. ·when were you planning on leaving1 
A. That week of the accident. 
Q. Mrs. Crocker, you came to town to Winchester on the 
day of this accident for the purpose of taking your child to 
Dr. Gibson, didn't you 7 
A. Yes~ sir. 
Q. And you came in your father's car1 
A. Yes., sir. 
Q. And he brought you and your child to ·winchester at 
your request, didn't he 1 
A. Yes, sir. T 
page 92 } Q. Now, l\Irs. Crocker, you did go to Dr. Gib-
son's office and he examined your child while 
there 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And then your father caJled for you and picked you up 
and you and your father and mother started back to your 
father's home in Stephens CityY 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you remember about what time you left \Vinchester 
on your return home 1 
A. The latter part of the morning. 
Q. What was the condition of the weather when yo·u Jeff 
Winchester 7 
A. It was snowing. 
Q. \:Vhat was the condition of the road? 
A. It was covered with snow. 
Q. :Mrs. Crocker, where were you seated in the car! 
A. On the front seat. 
Q. With your father 1 
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A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And what was the condition of the weather when you 
got to Bartonsville ? 
A. As I recall, it was still snowing. 
Q. And what was the condition of the road at Bal'tonsville 
when you got there? 
A. Covered wit11 snow. 
page 93 } Q. Now, you recall seeing these snow plows 
ahead of you, do you 'l 
A. Yes, sir. 
. Q. A.nd Mrs. Crocker, you luwe travelled the roacl8 from 
Stephens City to ·winchester frequently during your lifetime, 
have vou noU 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you were familiar with the grade of the road and 
the turn in tbe road just south of Bartonsville, were you not, 
where this accident occurred? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Mrs. Crocker, you recall, do you not, that your father 
pulled to his left to pass these snow plows as he was going 
up the hilU 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And do you recall the position of tbe snow plows in the 
road when you first observed them? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you observe wlmt tliey were doing there? 
A. Only that they were removing snow from the roa~. 
Q. And do you recall that the car that you were riding in 
was driven to the left to pass tho$e snow plows 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you see the car that was ahead 'of you with which 
your car collided before the accident occurred! 
page 94} A. Just at the time. 
Q. Just as it happened? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. "'hat happened to rour car, :Mrs. Crocker, the car you 
were riding in j 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Did it start in to spin, to skid? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. l\Irs. Crocker, did you say anything to your father as 
he drove up the hill past these plows! 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Do you know approximately how fast your father was 
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driving when he went up the hill at Bartonsville and passed 
these snow plows f 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You lrnven 't any idea about that 1 
A. No, sir. 
Mr. Kuykendall: I think that's all 
(Witness excused.) 
l\f r. Kern : Plaintiff rests. 
Judge Marshall: We will adjourn at this time for lunch. 
(Whereupon, at 12 :55 o'clock, p. m., after proper caution-
ing of the jury,, the trial was adjourned, to reconvene at two 
o'clock, p. m. of the same day.) 
page 95} AFTERNOON SESSION. 
(Whereupon, upon reconvening tl1e trial, the court and 
counsel retired to chambers, where the following discussion 
was had.) 
Mr. Kuykendall: We move to strike the plaintiff's evidence 
for the following reasons: One is that the testimony dis-
closes that i\Ir. Steele was the agent of l\Irs. Crocker, that the 
trip to ,Yinchester was nt the request of Mrs. Crocker nnd 
on a matter of business of her own interest, and that Mr. 
Steele brought her to ,vinchester in order that she might 
bring her child to tho doctor, and that when he undertook 
to drive l1er to ·winchester in his car with her on the front 
seat, in his presence, that he was operating it under lier di-
rection and was therefore subject to her control, anu that it 
is presumed, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, 
that when Mr. Steele drove 't11is automobile past the snow 
plows under the conditions that existed that it was done in 
her presence, of course, and with her acquiescence, and that 
it is the act of the plaintiff, Mrs. Crocker, and that sl1e can't 
recover for the negligence of her agent and servant who was 
operating tl1e vehicle in ber presence and presumably under 
her direction. 
The second ground is thnt the evidence as disclosed by the 
plaintiff's testimony-I menn by that all of the evidence-
shows that if Mr. Steele was guilty of gross negligence in the 
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operation of the car that Mrs. Crocker was guilty 
page 96 ~ of contributory negligence, which bars her re-
covery. That ahe observed the conditions~ she saw 
and should have seen the action of Mr. Steele in the operation 
of his car and the course that the car was taking, and that 
she was charged with knowledge of the danger then existing 
and the potential danger ahead and she said nothing to her 
father and mad.e no effol't to control his actions in the matter, 
which shows that she was as a matter of law guilty of con-
tributory negligence. The burden is upon a person who ob-
serves or. should observe a dangerous situation while a guest 
in the car, if she be a guest, to remonstrate with the driver 
and thus endeavor to avoid the danger that may result where 
it is inevitable from the reckless conduct of the driver, and 
that the failure to do that is a tacit acquiescence in that char-
acter of driving, and if the guest is lmrt she cannot thereafter 
complain. · 
The most recent case on this question is Butler v. Darden, 
189 Va. 459. It is the last expression of the Court of Appeals 
on this question, and I think it clearly states the doctrine as 
it exists in Virginia. I think tlie facts are of such character 
in the 1·eported case as to be a sufficient parallel to the case 
at bar and would thus control it. In 01·der that Your Honor 
may have the facts, I take tbe liberty of reading them, be-
cause I think it is important. 
('Whereupon, Mr. Kuykendall read the facts in the above-
mentioned case.) · 
page 97 ~ Mr. Kuvkendall: In tbat case the court sustained 
the trial court in setting aside tbe verdict in favor 
of the plaintiff against the operator of the car, and we take 
the view that that is a parallel in this case. Here was Mrs. 
Crocker riding with her father. She saw these plows there, 
she knew the conditions of the weather, she knew there were 
no chains on the car, sbe was familiar with the road, had 
driven back and forth over it· for years, she knew that the 
visibility was poor. 
Evidence in this record is that the condition of the road 
was so bad that the driver of the New York cnr drove with 
the wheels off the road to keep from sliding. :Mr. Steele un-
dertook to negotiate the passage of fl1ese three plows, and if 
that was gross negligence, s11e was equally guilty of negli-
gence. He passed the last truck,, if I recall the evidence cor-
rectly, in the northbound lane of traffic, passed one, moved 
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over and passed the other and then passed the other on a bill 
on a curve, poor visibility and the road slippery, and there 
was no remonstration on the part of the plaintiff, no effort 
to control the conduct of the driver, and to my way of think-
ing, that is an exact parallel to this. The court in this last 
case says, "By the side of the driver sat the plaintiff con-
testant. All that was visible to the one was equally visible 
to the other." And it is so admitted in this case, and there 
is no proof or even a suggestion that Mrs. Crocker or l\Ir. 
Steele by word or act took any precaution for her safety. 
Upon the record they are both equally guilty of 
page 98 ~ negligence. 
Now, I have here some other cases that are very 
much in line with that. I mean, they follow the same gen-
eral principle. I will state them in the record . 
• Judge Marshall: Are they railroad track cases! 
Mr. Kuykendall: No, sir. 
,Judge :Marshall: Just give me n brief outline of the facts 
of them. 
l\Ir. Kuykendall: Sutton v. Blmik, 166 Va. 132. 
This was a case not directly in point where the passenger 
rode in the back seat picking a banjo, and the driver was 
using liquor, and they got onto the wrong side of the road. It 
was a question of whether or not he knew of that, and he had 
sufficiently accounted for his lack of attention to the situa-
tion there. 
Now., in this article in the Virginia Law Review is a pretty 
good discussion on the liabilities of drivers to guests, and 
the coUl't ]1ere refers to some cases other than Virginia cases. 
He comes to this conclusion: "If a passenger is not satisfied 
with the manner in which it is operated, by remaining silent 
he is presumed to have elected to assume the risks.'' Clark 
v. Travelers. 
Judge l\Iarshall: Those are cases where it is drunk or 
reckless drivers. 
Mr. Benham: Continuing negligence. 
page 99 ~ Judge l\Inrshall: This new case is the closest 
one of this one. In other words, thev have gone a 
little farther there than they ever have. · 
Mr. Kuykendall: No, I don't think they have definitely an-
nounced the rule that is in line with this. 
,Judge :Marshall: You sav this pnrallels it because it is 
slippery paYement 1 · 
.Mr. Kuykendall: Slippery pavement, knowing visibility 
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was poor, so bad that this New York car was driving with the 
wheels off the road. 
Judge Marshall: That isn't the element of negligence in 
this case. It wasn't negligence up until he turned out to go 
around that first truck. 
Mr. Kuydcmclnll: That is right, and tl1at was negligence. 
Judge Marshall: There is nothing to show that be was go-
ing to turn out in there, ~·ou see. ,vhat could she have done 
right there Y 
Mr. Kuykendall: She could have said, "Don't go around 
these trucks.'' 
Judge Marshall: He'd be half-way around by tho time she 
got that out of her mouth. 
Mr. Kuykendall: I don't agree with you. 
I move to strike on the ground that the evidence does not 
prove gross negligence. The other car had stopped. Had he 
· not skidded, there wouldn't have been any colli-
page 100 ~ sion, and the mere fact that he skidded it1n 't proof 
of gross negligence. And you can't say that the 
direct and proximate result of passing this last vehicle in the 
other lane of traffic produced these injuries, because it was 
due not to that but to skidding conditions and the condition 
of the road. 
Judge l\Iarshall: Any other! 
:Mr. Kuykendall: The first one that :Mr. Steele was her 
agent and that she was charged with his negligence and his 
negligence was commuted to her. 
Judge Marshall: Any others, 
l\ir. Kuykendall: I move to strik~ also on the ground that 
Mrs. Crocker, by riding with her father under those circum-
stances, knowing that there were no chains on tlte car, and 
under the conditions prevailing, assumed the risk that the car 
might skid and bring about injuries, that after all the proxi-
mate cause of tbe collision was the skidding. 
Junge l\Iarsball: ,v1mt is your answer to it 1 
l\Ir. Benham: There is 110 evide11ce of master a11d servant. 
They were coming up not only to bring this cl1ild to the doc-
tor, but also to get groceries for tllc wife, just a family party 
coming to town. No evidence of payment on her part or peti-
tion on her part, and I don't think any cases sustain this view 
of C?ntributory neglig·c11ce. I think the case is clearly gross 
neghgence. 
page 101 ~ 
Judge :Marshall: :Motion is overruled., 
:Mr. Kuykendall: Exception noted. 
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(Whereupon, the court and counsel returned to the court 
room.) 
\Vhereupon, 
RICHARD U. GOODE 
was called as a witness on behalf of the defendant, and hav-
ing been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as fol-
lows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By :Mr. Kuykendall: 
Q. ·wm you state your name? 
A. Richard Urquhart Goode. 
Q. W'here do you live i 
A. 203 South Braddock Street. 
Q. In Winchester 7 
A. In 'Winchester. 
Q. What is your occupation Y 
A. Certified land surveyor. 
Q. Mr. Goode, would you please state whether you made 
any measurements of the road and the hill just to the south of 
Bartonsville Y 
A. Yes, sir, I made measurements of the road and the hill 
just south of Bartonsville. 
Q. Are you familiar with the location there? You have 
been out there and looked at it, have you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Will you please state whether there is a 
page 102 ~ brick or concrete culvert rigl1t at the foot of the 
hill there at Bartonsville Y 
A. Yes, there is a concrete bridge right at the foot of the 
bill. 
Q. Will you please state the width of the road there? 
A. Well, the width of the pavement is 28 feet, includin~ the 
width of the shoulder would be 44 feet, and the distance rrom 
fence to fence would be 80 feet. 
Q. Is that distance the same all the way up the hill there 
at Bartonsville7 
A. It runs about the same all the way up. The fences are 
the same distance all the way, the pavement is the same, 28 
feet. The shoulders might widen a little, but the average is 
44 feet, including the 8houlder. 
Q. Now, did you make any measurement as to the distance 
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from the foot of the hill to the top of the hill iust south of 
Bartonsville, speaking of the hill there at Bartonsville1 
A. I took elevations from the foot of the hill for a distance 
of 1,500 feet south, and there was a changing grade or there 
was a break in tlte grade at three points. The first real break 
in the grade is about .200 feet south of tlie bridge. The road 
sta11s a rise and rises about a 6 per cent grade for a distance 
of 400 feet. So at that point, 600 feet south of the bridge, 
the rise tapers off to a 3 per cent grade and holds that for 
another 600 feet, and that point would be about 
page 103 } 1,200 feet south of the bridge, and from tl1en on 
. for the next 400 feet it only rises 3 feet, in the 
next 400, SQ you l1ave three different grades there. 
Q. And _you took a measurement for what total distance 7 
A. I took a measurement for a total distance of 1.500 feet 
from the bridge to the last point where it is practicaily level. 
Q. Did you determine the degree of the curve in the hill 
that rises from Bartonsville and goes up, that yon have 
spoken on 
A. The road curves to the left nncl to the east and starts 
curving from the bottom of the hill, and in a distance of 880 
feet the road swings off to the left, off of the stmight line a 
distance of 78 feet. 
Q. And is that a gradual curve 1 
A. That's, I'd say, a medium curve. It's 78 feet deflection 
in a distance of 880 feet. 
Q. Beyond that 880 feet is there any more curve, or does 
the road straighten? 
A. It straightens out. 
Mr. Kuykendall: That's all. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
Bv l\fr. Kern: 
• Q. Did you notice the curve sign and its position! It is on 
the t)ast side of the road coming· north. 
page 104 ~ A. I don't remember. I don't have that. 
Q. Yon don't have that in your measurements 1 
A. I don't have that. 
Mr. Kern: That's all. 
('Vitness excused.) 
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was called as a witness on his own behalf, and having been 
first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EX.•L\IINATION. 
By Mr. Kuykendall: 
Q. \Vill you state your uame, please f 
A. Julian D. Steele. 
Q. Mr. Steele, you were driving your automobile on the 
date that this collision occurred, were you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. ,vhy did you come to \Vinchester that day? 
A. "r ell, we came down-my daughter had an appointment 
with the doctor. 
Q. And you brought her to town, did you f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. \V110 c~me with you 1 
A. :My wife came along and my daughter brought lier baby 
along with her. 
page 105 ~ Q. Mr. Steele, ahout what time clicl you leave 
to go back to your home that day, do you recall? 
A. It was something after eleven o'clock. 
Q. In the morning 1 
A. In the morning, yes, sir. 
Q. " 7hat was the condition of the weather at that time? 
A. \Veil, it had been snowing lightly and just about stopped 
snowing. 1\Iigl1t have been a small amount of snow still fall-
ing-very light. • 
Q. \Vhat was the condition of the road generally speaking 
from "\Vincl1ester to the point of this aeciclent? 
A. "\Veil, the roads were covered with snow. 
Q. Did you have any chains on your car? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Mr. Steele, when you p:ot to Bartonsville what did :rn.u 
observe ahead of vou in thn road! 
A. I saw snow· plows. and there was one just after I 
crossed Bartonsville brid!re. and there was another one about 
half-way up Bartonsvi11e· hill and another one up at the top 
of the hill pushing the snow out to the right. 
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Q. "\Vhen you saw these snow plows what did you determine 
to do? 
A. I started to go around them, bad to pass them one at 
a time. 
. Q. Did you continue on, or did you slow up as 
page 106 ~ you went up the hill Y 
A. No, I went about the same speed. 
Q. You passed one right after the other, did you 7 
A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. ,vhat was the condition of the road on tl1e Bartonsville 
hill? 
A. w· ell, the road didn't seem to be bad. ,v e hadn't had 
any trouble that morning. 
Q. Was it snowing at that time? 
A. It may bave been snowing very ligbtly. 
. Q. And did your daughter make any protest to you about 
the manner in wbich you drove your car on the Bartonsville 
hill in passing these snow plows? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. She made no objection about the manner in which you 
operated vour car? 
A. No, 'sir. 
Q. Now, what caused your car to be involved in the colli-
sion? 
Mr. Benlmm: I object to the question as given. It calls 
for a conclusion. 
Judge Marshall: Objection sustained. 
l\Ir. Kuykendall: Exception noted. 
Judge Marshall: Exception noted. 
By Mr. Kuykendall: 
page 107 ~ Q. Was your automobile involved in a collision f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Tell what occurred. 
A. After I passed the last snow plow that threw me over 
into the left-hand lane going south, and I saw a car coming 
up that lane, and I started to pull back for the right-hand side 
of the road, and my car went into a-started to skid and was 
out of control. 
Q. Which lane did you pull into to pass the last snow plow? 
A. ,ven, the road was covered with snow. You couldn't 
tell exactly where you were, but I suppose I was near over in 
the left-hand lane. 
Q. Going south? 
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Q. And you were in that lnne when you "Started to pass the 
last cnr, is that right f 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And how far past the last plow had you gotten when 
· your car started skidding! 
A. I don't know, I would Ray I thought around 75 feet .. 
Q. And it was then that you turned to go back into the 
middle lane, was itf 
A. I was turning in the middle lane when it started to skid. 
I '\\ras going from the first lane back to my lane. I 
page 108 } suppose I was in the middle lane as the car went 
into the skid. 
Q. You were in the middle lane when the car went into tl1e 
skid? 
A. As far as I could tell, yes. 
Q. And do you know how fast you were travelling as you 
passed these snow plows? . 
A. I thought I was travelling 30 miles an hour. 
Q. Do you know how far your car skidded before it collided 
with this other automobile from New Yorkf 
A. No, sir, I do not. 
Q. Do you have any idea 7 
A. No., sir, I haven't any idea. 
Mr. Kuykendall: I think thatis all. 
:Mr. Kern: That's nll. 
(Witness excused.) 
:Mr. Kuykendall: Mr. DeHnven. 
Whereupon, 
SHERIFF ROBERT DeHAVEN 
I' 
a witness, having been previously duly sworn, was recalled to 
the stand on behalf of the defendant, was examined and testi-
fied as follows : · 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
Bv Mr. Kuykendall: 
·Q. Mr. DeHaven, you are the sheriff of Frederick County? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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case that you were called to the scene of the acci-
dent tbnt occurred between the car operated by Mr. Steele and 
the car operated by Mr. Lewis at Bartonsville. · W11at was tbe-
conclition of the road between he1·e and Ba1tonsville that day 
when you went out theref 
A. It was slippery all the way. 
Q. And what was the condition of the Bartonsville hill T 
A. It ,vas also slippery. 
l\Ir. Kern:· He has gone into tliat in chief. He was our 
witness in chief, and he cross-examined this morning. The 
only positive effect would be rebuttal. This is in evidence. 
Judge Marshall: ·what do you mean, rebuttal.· This is 
evidence in chief. 
Mr. Benham: "Te asked llim exactly tlle same question. 
,ve asked him if the road was slippery. That's all we put 
him on for. 
Mr. Kuykendall: What are you objecting about, then? 
Judge :Marshall: Having him repeat. 
Mr. Kuykendall: I am not sure, Your Honor. That is why 
I put him on. I don't recall the evidence. 
By :Mr. Kuykendall: 
Q. ,vhat was on the road as you observed, could you tell 'l 
A. There was a sheet of snow. It snowed the night before 
and traffic ran over it. Apparently they hadn't started scrap-
ing until tl1is morning. It was cold, it hadn't be-
page 110 ~ gun thawing yet at all. 
1Ir. Kuykendall: I think that's all. 
('Vitness excused.) 
l\Ir. Kuydendall: The defendnnt rests. 
,Judge Marshall: Any rebuttaU 
Mr. Benham: No, sir. 
Judge Marshall: Gentlemen of the jury, upon motion of 
counsel for both parties yon nre ordered to view the scene of 
tlle accident. The slieriff will accompany you to tile place 
wl1erc the accident occurred. Yon are instructed not to talk 
to anyone about this case wl1ile viewing the scene, nor shall 
you permit anyone to discuss the case with you. Viewing the 
scene of tlie accident is part of the trial of the case. I fur-
ther instruct yon not to discuss the case among yourselves 
insofar as endeavoring to arrive at a conclusion in tli.is case~ 
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as you shall not do this until you have heard the instructions 
of the court and argument of counsel. After you have viewed 
the scene of the accident, you will return to the courtroom. 
(After viewing the place of the accident., the jury returned 
to the courtroom.) 
Judge 'Marshall: Gentlemen of t110 jury, there will be some 
delay ,vhile the instructions are prepared, and we will recess 
until that time. 
("Whereupon, at 3 :30 o'clock, p. m., the taking of testimony 
in the above-entitled matter was closed, and the 
page 111 ~ court and counsel retired to chambers to prepare 
instructions to tll~ jury.) 
l\Ir. Kuykendall: Your Honor, I now move to strike the 
evidence of the plaintiff in the light of the testimony by the 
defendant, on the grounds theretofore stated upon a previous 
motion to strike the plaintiff's evidence. 
Judge :Marshall: The motion is overruled for reasons here-
tofore stated. 
Mr. Kuykendall: Defendant excepts to the action of the 
court for the reasons heretofore stated. 
Mr. Benham: I think, Judge, we ought to~ without arguing, 
just make a motion to strike the defendant's evidence. 
Judge l\Iarslmll: If you make it, you are going to argue 
it. On wlmt grounds 1 
Mr. Benham: That the evidence shows gross negligence as 
a matter of law. · , 
Judge l\farshall: Do yon argue that seridusly1 
l\Ir. Benham: Not too seriouslv. 
Judge l\Iarshall: Have the record sl10w that he does not 
argue it seriously and doesn't believe in the motion. 
page 112 ~ Mr. Benham:· I be1ieve in the motion, but I-
.Judge Marshall: I want to henr the arg11me1)t 
on it, then. I think it's a serious question. 
:Mr. Benham: I think it's a close question. 
Judge Marshall: In other words, yon want to inject error 
in the record without my considering it. 
~Ir. Benham: Oh, no. 
Judge l\Iarshall: Then why did you say thaU Isn't that 
the h1ference you got from that, Mr. Kuykendall? > 
l\I r. Benham: I think it's a cloRe question, but I think that 
the evidence is sufficient for the judge to decide it. It's an 
amount of evidence. It's not at all on the subject. It's very 
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irregular, to tell tho truth. I don't know what the Supreme 
Court has said. 
,Judge Marshall: There have been some ve1•y recent cases 
on it. 
Mr. Benham: Some verv recent cases. This meets the re-
quirements of cases of drh~ing on the left-hand side. I think 
-there are some requirements. . 
Judge l\Iarshall: I do, too. 
Mr. Kuykendall: I don't think that. I think it's a jury 
question. I think the jury has a right to determine from tl1is 
evidence whether or not Mr. Steele is guilty of gross negli-
gence in the manner in whieh he drove bis car in this case. I 
think you should discha rgc the notice of motion, and I oppose 
the motion to strike the defendant's evidence. 
page 113 ~ Judge llnrshall: I still think it is gross neg-
ligence, as close as anybody put him to the top 
of that hill. The farthest they put him is 200 feet. 1.\ man 
going up a hill on the left side of the road all the way over 
in the left driveway, with it slippery, obviously couldn't he 
under as good control as if it had been dry, and the visibility 
poor. If that's not gross negligenre--iu the first place, it's 
violating· the statute. Negligence verse. ·we have held that 
before. 
Mr. Benham: It's simple negligence, verse. 
Judge Marshall: But now he is violating a statute, which 
is obviously designed to prevent this sort of thing. So if you 
make the motimi, I dou 't care whether you argue it seriously, 
I do think-I have thought so all day, been thinking about it 
all day-let's see, what is that Inst case they held it was 
gross negligence as a matter of law? 
:Mr. Kern: ,v aller. 
,Judge l\Iarslrnll: The Florida case thev held that accord-
ing to the Florida law. · 
:\Ir. Benham: That's the "r aller case . 
• Judge Marshall: ,vimt did they say in that case? ,vhat 
were the facts? 
l\Ir. Benham: The facts were he was going around a curve 
he couldn't see around, on the left-hand side of the road . 
• Judge Marshall: And n dry road and went on the other 
man's side. "My gracious alive, if that's gross 
page 114 } negligence, wlmt clo you call this t 
~Ir. Benham: I call this gross ne2"Iigence. 
That's what I call it. '"' 
Judge Marshall: I think it is. 
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Mr. Kuykendall: Do I understand the court has sustained 
the motion to strike the defendant's testimony? 
Judge ~Iarshall : Yes. 
Mr. Kuykendall: All of it 't 
Judge l\Iarshall: All the evidence defending against gross 
negligence. 
l\f r. Kuykendall: I except to the ruling of the court as 
contrary to the law under tlie evidence. But as I understand 
now, the evidence is not stricken in so far as it may tend to 
show negligence on the part of the plaintiff. 
Judge Marshall: There has been no motion on that. 
l\Ir. Benham: I am going to move tbat. I am going to 
move a judge's instruction on that. There is no evidence that 
lie was the agent of bis daughter. The evidence we have got 
to support that was that the father was bringing her in to 
sec tbe doctor for her child. The evidence was to bring his 
wife in to get groceries. 
Judge Marshall: Suppose tl1ey contend tliat there was an 
agency 1·clationship. Can they contend that under general 
issue plea? 
l\Ir. Kern: They have got to deny it ~nder oath. 
l\f r. Benham: I don't thmk you can prove it 
page 115 ~ under general issue. 
Judge l\Iarshall: If they have to raise it under 
special plea, then it's not an issue in the case if they didn't 
file a general issue plea. So I don't know how you can con~ 
sider whetber or not they have got the burden, or anything. 
His evidence is that his daughtl'r was visiting and be 
brought tlie daughter in to the doctor and to get some gro-
ceries. They didu 't pay him anything. Nobody asked that, 
so we will have to assume she didn't. And she has been 
emancipated; she doesn't live witl1 him. I would say that's 
guest relationship. ,vimt do you say? 
l\fr. Kuykendall: I say it's agency . 
• Judge Marshall: I ,vill rule that out of the case. 
,vhat they contend is that I have got to rule as a matter 
of law now that she is not guilty of contributory negligence. 
In other words, they say not only arc you wrong, but YOU are 
terribly wrong, because the court as a matter of law iias got 
to say that this woman should not have made any remon-
strance. 
l\f r. Kuykendall: I say the man was guilty of contributory 
negligence as a matter of law in the first place, and that if 
the court says she isn't as a matter of law, it is certainly a 
jury question under any circumshmces. And you can't say 
that the jury has got a right to say she remonstrated; or there 
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was no duty on he1· to remonstrate and that s11e 
page 116 ~ sat there and neve1· opened her mouth and was 
perfectly content to be driven to l1er doom; or to 
say a reasonable person wouldn't have a right to protest. 
Judge Marshall: I am against you on that. I will bold 
that it is a jury question whether she is guilty of contributory 
negligence. 
Mr. Kern: We except to the court's ruling. 
Mr. Benham: On the ground that there is no evidence to 
support contributory negligence on her part. 
,ve except to the court's ruling that their evidence permits 
stating the finding of conh-ibutory negligence and also except 
to any insertion of any of it in any of the instructions for the 
defense of co~tribntory negligence. 
INSTRUCTIONS GRANTED AND GIVEN TO THE JURY 
BY THE COURT. 
Instructioil No. 1. 
The court instructs the jury that if the defendant relies 
upon the contributory negligence of the plaintiff as a defense 
in this case, then the burden is upon the def cndant to prove 
such contributory negligence by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, unless such contributory negligence is disclosed by 
plaintiff's evidence or cau be fairly inferred from the circum-
stances. · 
l'll.sfruction No. 2. 
The court instructs the jm·y that when Steele drove llis car 
into his l~ft-hancl traffic lane in passing the snow 
page 117 ~ plow driven by R.R. Triplett, tlien he was guilty 
of gross negligence whi('h constituted a proximate 
cause of the collision, and unless th<' jnry believe from a pre-
ponderance of Urn evidence that tlic plaintiff was guilty of 
contributory negligence as deiint'd in the otlier instructions, 
then the jury shall find a verdict for tI1e plaintiff. 
I11struction No. 3. 
The court instructs the jury tlmt tlie law places a datv upon 
a guest in an automobile to warn tlle driver of the ai1tomo-
bile in which 11e is riding of apparent danger of which the 
guest has knowledge, or in the exe1·cise of reasonable care 
should have knowledge, and to protest against any negligent 
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operation of the automobile which is apparent, or under the 
. circumstances., should reasonably be apparent to the guest. 
In this case, if you find from a preponderance of the evi-
dence tllat the plaintiff, at the time that she saw or under the. 
circumstances reasonably should lmve seen that .Steele was 
about to pass the snow plow, driven by R. R. Triplett, in the 
left-hand traffic lane, failed to warn Steele of the danger and 
to protest against such act and that such failure on her part 
constituted a proximate cause of the collision, you shall find 
a verdict for the defendant. 
Instruction No. 4. 
The court instructs the .iury that e:ven though you believe 
from a preponderance of the evidence that 1'Iarr 
page 118 } Steele Crocker was negligent in failing to object 
when Julian D. Steele drove into the east lane of 
traffic in order to pass the snow plow driven by R.R. Triplett, 
unless you also believe that when she saw or should have seen 
that Julian D. Steele was going to attempt to pass the snow 
plow driven by R. R. Triplett by going into the east lane of 
traffic that Marv Steele Crocker then had sufficient time with-
in which to make au effective objection, nnd that her fnilure 
to do so was a dh·ect proximate cause of the injuries aJleged 
by her, then you shall find for l\fary Steele Crocker. 
Instruction No. 5. 
The court instructs the jury that the burden of proof is on 
the plaintiff to establish by a preponrlernnce of the evidence 
that the negligence of the defendant is the direct and proxi-
mate cause of the injuries of which she complains. You may 
not engage in conjecture or speculation in determining what 
should be a proper amount to award the plaintiff, for you 
may only make such an nward upon the evidence before you. 
You are further instructed that von mnv award onlv such 
sums as will compensate the plaintiff for the losses which the 
evidence shows that she has sustained, and as will reasonahl? 
compensate her for the h1.inrics that she has suffered. You 
may not make an award of dmnages for the purpose of penal-
izing the clef endant for his act of negligence, but may only 
award compensatory damages. 
page 119 } Inst ruction No. 6. 
The court instructs the jury that if you find for the plnin-
tiff, :Mary Steel Crocker, you should allow he1· such sum as 
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you believe from the evidence will compensate her for the 
injuries received, not to exceed $25,000.00. 
In estimating such damages, you may consider any bodily 
injuries she sustained; the permanent or temporary charac-
ter thereof.; any bodily disfigurement sl1e may have suffered; 
uny pain or mental ang'Uish caused by such injuries; the ef-
fect of such injuries upon her health; and the inconvenience 
they may have caused her. 
You may also consider whether sucb injuries have or will 
disable her to perform her duties, and in this connection you 
may consider her age and physical condition; and you may 
also consider any sums that may been expended by her for her 
medical and nursing care. 
DEFENDANT'S OB.JECTIONS TO INSTRUCTION 
GRANTED . 
• Judge :Marshall: l\Ir. Kuykendall, the court has heard your 
objections and argument supporting- your objection to certain 
of the instructions that I ha,·e granted, which I will give to 
the jury. You may now state your objections. 
Mr. Kuykendall: I have no objection to the granting of 
instruction No. 1. 
Instruction No. 2. Counsel for defendant ob-
page 120 } jects to the granting of Instruction No. 2 and ex-
cepts to tl1e action of the court in giving the in-
struction, for the reason tlmt it is solely within the province 
of tl1e jury to determine whether the defendant was guilty 
of gToss negligence. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Vir-
ginia lms consistently held tlm t whether or not there is gross 
negligence is a question for the jury. The evidence is not 
clear as to whether Mr. Steele was entirely in the northbound 
lane of traffic, and the evidence shows that he had turned to 
his right, and the jury has a right to find that he was entirely 
in the center lane of traffic at the time lie started skiclding. 
Even if he were entirely in the northbound lane of traffic, 
it is a matter for the jury to determine whether he was guilty 
of gross negligence. . 
Instruction No. 3. Counsel for defendant objects to grant-
ing Instruction No. 3 and excepts to the action of the court in 
granting this instruction, for the reason that Instruction No. 
F offered by the defendant correctly states the law applicable 
in this case and Instruction F should be granted instead of 
Instruction No. 3. Also. it is not neC'essarv for the defendant 
to show that the plaintiff was guilty of gross negli~ence in 
order to bar her recovery. The court has taken the view that 
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Steele was not guilty of g1·oss negligence unless he passed the 
snow plow ope1·ated by Triplett. However, it is not necessary 
for the de£endant to show that the plaintiff was silent at the 
time the defendant undertook to pass the Triplett 
page 121 } snow plow, for if she was negligent in any respect 
in failing to remonstrate with the driver in pass-
ing any of the snow plows on the hill and the curve under the 
weather conditions then existing, and if her negligence was a 
contributing proximate cause of her injuries, she may not 
recover. 
Instruction No. 4. Counsel for defendant objects to the 
granting of Iustruction No. 4 and excepts to the action of the 
court in granting said instruction for the reason that,it limits 
the consideration of the plaintiff's negligence to the time of 
passing the Triplett snow plow in the northbound lane of 
traffic. If plaintiff was negligent in failing to remonstrate 
with the driver of the car at any time while he was passing 
.any of the snow plows on the hill and curve under the weather 
conditions then existing, and if such negligence ,,,as a con-
tributing proximate cause of lier injmics, she should be barred 
of recovery. 
The instruction is also erroneous in that it leaves to the 
jury the determination of whether the plaintiff J1ad sufficient 
time to make an effective objection. It must be presumed 
that had any objection been made that it would have been 
heeded by the driver of the car in Yiew of the fact that plain-
tiff had tlie right to exercise C'ontrol over the operation of the 
car. The defendant was travelling slowly, and had lie taken 
ltis foot off of the accelerator before passing the Triplett 
snow plow it is apparent that he could have avoided the col-
lision. 
Instruction No. 6. Counsel for defendant ob-
page 122} jects to the granting of Instruction No. 6 and ex-
cepts to the action of the court in granting said 
instruction for tl1c reason that it submits to the jury a de-
termination of whether the injuries of which the plaintiff com-
plains are permanent in character and whether her injuries 
will disable her to pcrf orm her duties. There is no evidence 
on which the jury may find that the injuries of which the 
plaintiff complains nre permanent in character nor that they 
will permanentl~· disable her in the performance of her duties. 
Judge :Marshall: The defendant's objections and excep-
tions are noted. 
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page 123 ~ INSTRUCTIONS OFFERED BY DEFENDANT 
AND REFUSED BY THE COURT, AND 
THE OBJECTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS NOTED. 
l1zstrudio11 No. _1. 
TI1e court instructs the jury that the d~·iver of a motor ve-
llicle owes the duty to other people upon the highway to use 
ordinary cai~e for the safety of others upon tbe highway, not 
llis guest. By ordinary care is meant such care as a man of 
ordinary prudence would use in view of the circumstances 
confronting him in the operation of a motor vehicle. The 
failure to exercise ordina1·y cure for the protection of others. 
operating motor vehicles on the highway is negligence. 
However, the law does not impose upon the operator of a 
moto1· vehicle as high a degree of care for the safety of his 
guest riding in a ·motor vehicle with him. The law merely 
requires that the· operator of a motor vehicle use slight care 
for the safety of liis guest. Slight care is an act or omission 
of an aggmvated character respecting a legal duty, as clis-
tinb>"Uished from a mere failure to exercise ordinary care. The 
exercise of any degree of care by the operator of a motor ve-
bicle for the safety of his guest is at least slight care. 
l\Ir. Benham: Counsel for plaintiff objects to the granting 
of Instruction A upon the ground (1) that under the evidence 
offered defendant is guilty of negligence as a matter of law, 
and (2) that tl1c court has already ruled that defendant was 
guilty of gross negligence as a matter if law, and 
page 124 ~ this instruction is in conflict with that ruling; 
(3) that the second paragraplI of the instruction 
is not proper in form in that it is argumentative. It lays un-
due emphasis upon the slight degree of care required of de-
fendant. 
Judge :Marshall: T11e objection to tJie instruction is sus-
tained, and the court refascs to grant Defendant's Instruc-
tion No. A. 
:Mr. Kuykendall: Counsel for defendant excepts to tile ac-
tion of the court in refusing to grant defendant's Instruction 
No . .A for the reason that it correctly states the law appli-
cable in tliis case. Also, the burden is upon tile plaintiff to 
prove tlrnt tlie defendant was guilty of gross neg·ligence ancl 
that sucl1 negligence was the sole proximate cause of the in-
juries of wl1ich plaintiff complains. The ref ore it is proper 
that the court instruct tbe jury as to the degree of care re-
quired of the defendant and to distinguish the character 
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of negligence tlmt must be shown in this case from that re-
quired to be shown in cases whe1·e the guest relationship does 
not exist. 
page 125 ~ Instruction No. B. 
The court instructs the jury that it is the duty of a guest· 
or passenger in a motor vehicle to protest and object to the 
negligent and ~are]ess operation of the motor vehicle by the 
driver, and if tl1e guest or passenger fails to so object or 
protest, then the guest is guilty of negligence and such negli-
gence is a proximate contributing cause of any injuries or 
loss that may be sustninccl by the guest 01· passenger, thus 
barring the right of recovery by the guest or passenger. 
Mr. Benham: Plaintiff objects to the granting of Instruc-
tion B upon the grounds· (1) the matter has already been 
covered by the court in Instruction No. 3 heretofore granted 
defendant, and (2) hecnuse Instruction B is not a correct 
statement of the law; (3) because the instruction tells the 
jury that if a passenger fails to object, then the guest is guilty 
of negligence and that such negligence is a proximate con-
tributing cause, whereas it would be a matter for the jury to 
determine whether or not it was a proximate contributing 
cause, and a guest is only required to protest and object to 
the careless operation of a driver when the guest has the 
opportunity to make such nn objection and protest, when such 
objection and protest would be effective, and ( 4) that there 
is no evidence upon which the jury could make a finding thaf 
plaintiff was contributorily negligent. 
.Judge :Marshall: The court sustains the objec-
page 126 ~ tion to clefendnnt 's Instruction No. B and refusei;; 
to grant the instruction as requested by the de-
fendant. 
).Ir. Kuykendall: Coun!-c>l for defendant excepts to the ac.: 
tion of the court in refusing to g;rant clefendnnt 's Instruction 
No. B for the reason t1mt' it correctly states the law appJi-
cable in this case, and for the further reason that there is 
always the duty upon the ~rncst to protest and object to the 
negligent and careless operation of a motor vehicle by the 
driver. The evidence in this case shows that the guest was at 
a11 times fully aware of the negligent conduct of the driver of 
the car, that there was no protest or objection made hy the 
plaintiff, and that the plnintiff was therefore guilty of neg;-
ligence as a matter of Jnw, which contributed proximately to 
her injury. The instruction ma~· be too general as applied to 
other cases; wherea!S, in this case the evidence shows that the 
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plaintiff was guilty of negligence as a matter of law and that 
her negligence was a contributing proximate cause of her in-
juries. The instruction should be given as offered. 
page 127 ~ Instruct-ion No. C. 
The court instructs the jury that if they believe from the 
evidence that the defendant, Julian Steele, the driver of the 
automobile in which Mary Crocker was riding, was negligent 
in the operation of the saiq. automobile, and if the jury be-
lieve that such negligence of the driver of the said automo-
bile was a proximate cause which contributed to the injuries 
of Mary Crocker, then in order· for this negligence of the 
said driver to be charged to the said Mary Crocker, the jury 
must believe that tlic said :Marv Crocker and the driver of 
the automobile, Julian Steele, in which she was riding, were 
on February 4, 1948, engaged in a joint venture, and the court 
instructs the jury that by joint venture it is meant that tlle said 
Mary Crocker and the driver of the nutomobile had a common 
purpose in the journey upon which they were at that time em-
barked, and that the suid :Mary Crocker and the said driver 
liad an equal voice in the operation and control of the move-
ments of the said automobile, and if the jury believe from the 
evidence that the said 1\farv Crocker and the driver of the 
automobile in which she was 1·icling were engaged in a joint 
venture at the time of this accident, then the negligence, if 
any, of the driver of the said automobile is charged to the 
said )Iary Crocker, and if the jury believe that the negligence, 
if any, of the driver of said automobile was a proximate cause 
of, or contributed to the injuries of l\Iary Crocker, then the 
jury must find their verdict for the defendant. 
page 128 } Mr. Benham: The plaintiff objects to the 
. granting of defendant's Instruction C upon the 
ground (1) there is no evidence upon which the jury could 
find Julian Steel and Mary Crocker were engaged in a joint 
venture; (2) that there is no evidence that Mary Crocker and 
.Julian Steele had an equal voice in the operation and control 
of the automobile. 
Judge l\Iarshall: Defendant's Instruction No. C is refused. 
There is no evidence of joint venture in this case, aud this 
case does not present the question of imputing the defend-
unt 's negli~ence to the plaintiff. 
l\lr. Kuykendall: Counsel for cfofendant excepts to the ac-
tion of the court in 1·efusing to A"rant defendant's Instruction 
No. C for the reason that the evidence in this case does show 
that Julian Steele was the agent of Mary Crocker in the op· 
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cmtion of his automobile, that she had a voice in his coutrol 
and operation, and that she under the eircumstances was duty 
bound to conh·ol the operation of the car, for failure to remon-
strate with the driver was an acquiescence in the manner in 
which the car was driven, and· as .Mr. Steele was her agent, 
his negligence must be imputed to her, and she, of course, 
cannot complain of her own negligence. 
page 129} Instruction No. D. 
The court instructs the jury that tl1e burden of proof is 
on the plaintiff to establish by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the negligence of the defendant is the direct and 
proximate cause of the damages which she seeks to recover. 
You may not engage in conjectUl'e or speculation in determin-
ing what should be a proper amount to award the plaintiff, 
for you may only make sueh an award upon the evidenee be-
fore you. The court furtlier instructs the jury that there is 
no evidence in this case of any permanent disability and, 
therefore, you cannot consider that fact. You are further 
instructed that you may award only such sums as will com-
pensate the plaintiff for the losses which the evidence shows 
that she has sustained, and as will reasonably compensate 
lier for the injuries that sbe has suffered. You may not make 
an award of damages for the purpose of penalizing the de-
fendant for his aet of negligence, but may only award com-
pensatory damages. 
Mr. Benham: Counsel for plaintiff objects to the granting 
of Instruction D upon the grounds (1) that the matter con-
tained in tbis instruction has already been fairly and amply 
presented to the jury by Instruction No. 5 granted by the 
court; (2) that there is evidence of permanent disability and 
the instruction errs in stating to the jury that there is no 
evidence, and (3) that the instruction is unduly labored in 
that it places too much emphasis on the burden of proof and 
upon the requirement that the finding must be 
page 130 } based upon tbe evidence. 
Judge Marshall: The court refuses to grant 
Defendant's Instruction No. D for the reason that there is 
evidence in the record of permanent disability, and it would 
be error to instruct the jury tl1at there is no such evidence. 
Mr. Kuykendall: Counsel for defendant excepts to the ac-
tion of the court in refusing to grant defendant's Instruction 
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No. D fo1· the reason that there is no evidence from which the 
jury might find that the plaintiff had suffered permanent dis-
ability. Instruction No. 5 granted by the court is not suf-
ficently comprehensive in that it omits telling the jury that 
there is no evidence of pe1manent disability. 
page 131 ~ Instruction No. E. 
The court instructs the jury that the burden is upon the 
plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
defendant, Steele, ,vas guilty of gross negligence as charged 
in the notice of motion for judgment~ and that such negligence 
was the sole proximate cause of the injuries of which tl1e 
plaintiff complains. If the plaintiff fails to carry this burden, 
the jury shall 1i~1d a verdict for the defendant, Steele. 
. . 
l\Ir. Benham.: Counsel for plaintiff object to the granting 
of Instruction.No. E upon the gronnds that it is contrary to 
the court's ruling that defendant was guilty of gross- negli-
gence as a matter of law. 
Judge Marshall: 'fhe court refnses to grant def endaut 's 
Instruction No. E for the reason that the evidence shows that 
the defendant Steele was guilty of gross negligence as a mat-
ter of law. The court has alreadv sustained a motion to 
strike the defendant's evidence insofar as it is off cred to 
prove that the defendant was uot guilty of gross negligence. 
l\Ir. Kuykendall: Counsel for defendant excepts to the ac-
tion of the court in refusing to grnnt defendant's Instruction 
No. E for the reason that whether or not there was gross neg-
ligence was a jury question. The Supreme Court of Appeals 
of Virginia has held without exception that the question of 
gross negligence is one for the jury to determine. The court 
should submit this question to the jmT under 
page 132 ~ proper ini;:truction, and even though the jurv maY 
find the defendant guilty of negligence, it ma,· 
take the view thnt his negligence was not gross. Had the 
court granted defendant's Instruction No. A in finclirn .. gross 
negligence the jury would lmve them been properly instructed 
and could under defendant's Instruction No. E determine 
whether or not the clef endant is guilty of gross negligence. 
page 133} I 11struction No. F. 
The court instructs the jury that tJie law places n duty 
upon a guest passenger in an automobile to warn the driver 
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of the automobile in which he is riding of apparent danger of 
which the guest has knowledge or, in the exercise of 1·eason-
able care should l1ave knowledge; and there is also a duty 
upon a guest passenger in the exercise of reasonable care to 
protest to the driver against the negligent operation of the 
automobile. 
The ref ore, if you find from a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the plaintiff, :Mary Crocker, without protest or ob-
jection, continued to· ride in Julian Steele's car after she dis-
covered, or by the exercise of ordinary care, should have 
discovered that tl1e defendant, Julian Steele, was driving his 
car in a negligent manner, she having an opportunity to pro-
test or object after sueh discovery, then the. plaintiff was 
guilty of negligence and cannot recover. 
l\Ir. Benham: Counsel for plaintiff objects to Instruction 
F on on the ground (1) that there is no evidence upon which 
the jury could find that plaintiff was guilty of negligence 
which was a contributing proximate cause of the accident; 
(2) there was no evidence from which the jury could find that 
defendant was negligent in the operation of his car before 
he attempted to pass the snow plow driven by R. R. Triplett; 
and (3) that there is no evidence that plaintiff had an op-
portunity of making an effectual protest after the negligence 
of defendant was, or under tlie exercise of rea-
page 134 ~ sonable care should have been, evident to her. 
Judge Marshall: The court refuses to gl'ant 
defendant's Instruction No. F for the reason that there was 
110 duty upon the plaintiff to protest or object until Julian 
Steele attempted to pass the third snow plow in the no11h-
bound lane of traffic. 
Mr. Kuykendall: Counsel for defendant excepts to the ac-
tion of the court in refusing to grant defendant's Instruction 
No. F for the reason that it is not 11ecessary for the defend-
ant to prove that the plaintiff, :Mary Crocker, was guilty of 
gross negligence before she would he barred of recovery. It 
is true that tl1e plaintiff must prove ·that the defendant is 
guilty of gross negligence in order to recover, but all that 
the defendant has to do is show that the plaintiff was guilty 
of negligence in refusing to protest and remo1istrate with the 
drh·er in doing what was clearly a negligent act on the part 
of the driver in attempting- to pass any of the snow plows on 
a hill around a slight curve when the road was slippery and 
dangerous to travel upon. The jury should be told that if 
the plaintiff knew, or in the exercise of reasonable rare should 
have known, that the defendant was negligent in the manner 
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in which he operated his automobile as he went up the hill 
and that that negligence continued and contrihuted to the 
injuries received by the plaintiff, then she is barred of re-
covery. 
page 135 ~ Instrnctfou No. G: 
The court instructs the jury thut Julian Steele was the 
agent of Mary Crocker while driving his car to and from ,vin-
chester at the request of the plaintiff, l\Iary Crocker, for the 
purpose of enabling her to take her child to the doctor; that 
,T ulian Steele is presumed, under the evidence in this case, to 
lmve been operuting his car uucle1· the direction of Mary 
Crocker .. It is presumed, therefore, that Julian Steele would 
have beetled a waming of Mary Crocker or a remonstrance 
by her as to the manner in which he operated his C'llr. 
Therefore, if you find from a preponderance of the evidence 
that the plaintiff, Mary Crocker, without protest or objec-
tion, continued to ride in Julian Steele's car after she dis-
covered, 'Or by the exercise of ordinary care shoul<l have 
discovered, that the defendant, ,Julian Steele.1 was driving his 
car in a negligent manner, she having an opportunity to pro-
test or object after such discovery, and that a reasonably 
prudent person under tliese circumstances would have taken 
such precaution for her own saf 1.•ty, then the plaintiff was 
guilty of negligence and cannot recover. 
l\[r. Benham: Counsel for plaintiff objects to tho granting 
of Instruction G upon the ground~ (1) that it is error for the 
court to tell the jury that Julian Stcl'le was the agent of Mary 
Crocker, (2) that there is no evidence upon wl1ich it could be 
found that Julian Steele was the agent of l\farv 
pnge 136 ~ Crocker, (3) and that the court in the instruction 
tells the jury that ,Julian Steele is presumed, un-
der the evidence in this case, to have been operating his car 
1111der the direction of Mary Crocker; that there is no evi-
dence upon which the jury could find that Mary Crocker had 
any opportunity of getting out of the automobile of ;Tuliau 
Steele after she discovered, or by the exercise of ordinary 
care should have discovered, that ,Julian Steele was driving 
his car in a negligent manner, and that there is no ('Vidence 
of any precaution :Mary Crocker might have taken for her 
own safety. 
,Judge Marshall: The court refuses to grant defendant's 
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Instruction No. G. There is 110 evidence that Julian Steele 
was the agent of :Mary Crocker, nor is it correct to state that 
there is a presumption that Julian Steele is presumed to bave 
operated his car under the direction of the plaintiff. Also, 
the instruction fails to confine the jury's consideration of the 
negligence of the plaintiff to the time at which Julian Steele 
drove or started to drive around the third snow plow in the 
northbound lane of traffic~ 
Mr. Kuykendall: Counsel for defendant excepts to the ac-
tion of the court in refusing to grant defendant's Instruction 
No. G for the reason tlmt Julian Steele and l\fary Crocker 
were engaged upon a joint venture; Julian Steele was there-
fore the agent of Mary Crocker; each party had an equal 
voice in the operation of the car, and it therefore is proper 
to instruct the jury that it would be presumed that 
page 137 ~ an agent would heed the voice and remonstrnnce 
of the plaintiff. For the reason lieretofore stated 
in exceptions to the action of the court in refusing to grant 
Instruction No. F, counsel states that the negligence of the 
plaintiff should not be confined to the operation of the car 
around the third snow plow in the northbound lane of traffic. 
It is not necessary that the jury find that she was guilty of 
gross negligence in order to bar her recovery. 
page 138 ~ Instruction No. H. 
The court instructs the jury that Julian Steele was the 
agent of l\fary Crocker while driving his car to and from Win-
chester at the request of the plaintiff, l\Iary Crocker, for the 
purpose of enabling her to take her child to the doctor; that 
.Julian Steele is presumed, under the evidence in this case, 
to have been opernting his car under the direetio11 of Mary 
Crocker. It is presumed, therefore, that Julian Steele would 
have heeded a warning of :Mary C1·ocker or a remonstrance 
by her as to the manner in wbich he operated his car. 
The ref ore, if you find from a preponderance of the evidence 
that the plaintiff, l\Inry Crocker, without protest or objection, 
continued to ride in Julian Steele's car after she discovered, 
or by the exercise of ordinary care, should have discovered 
that the defendnnt, ,Julian Steele, was driving his car in a 
negligent manner, she having an opportunity to protest or 
object after such discovery, then the plaintiff was guilty of 
negligence and cannot recover. 
Mr. Benham: Counsel for plaintiff objects for the same 
reasons as heretofore assigned to Instruction G. 
84 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Judge Marshall: The court refuses to grant defendant's 
Instruction H for the same reasons assigned to Instruction G. 
Mr. Kuykendall: Counsel for defendant excepts to the ac-
tion of the court in refusing to grant defendant's Instruction 
No. H for the same reasons assigned to the court's action in 
1·efusing to grant defendant's Instruction G. 
('Vhereupon, court was adjourned until 10 o'clock follow-
ing day.) 
page 139 ~ Wednesday, November 23, 1949 
PROCEEDINGS. 
('Whereupon, at 10 :00 o'clock, a. m., the hearing was re-
sumed, pursuant to recess.) 
Judge Marshall: Gentlemen of the jury, may I have your 
attention, please1 Gentlemen, the court strikes out all of 
the evidence of' the· defendant, .Julian Steele, offered for your 
consideration.in.support of the defendant's claim that he was 
not guilty of gross negligence as charged in the notice of 
motion for judgment. You are instructed that the evidence 
proves that the defendant is guilty of gross negligence as 
charged in the notice of motion for judgment, and you are not 
called upon to determine that question. You will therefore 
consider no evidence offered hy the defendant as tending to 
prove that he was not guilty of gross negligence. 
Now, gentlemen, I shall read to you the written instructions 
of the court, after which you will hear argument of counsel. 
('Vhereupon, the court read the instructions to the jury, 
after which counsel for both parties argued the case.) 
Judge :Marshall : Gentlemen of the jury, you mny now re-
tire to your room to consider of ~·om verdict. Let it be writ-
ten on the back of the notice. Elect your own f orcman after 
you retire to the jury room. 
('Vhereupon, the jury retired to consider of their verdict, 
and after deliberations, retumed into open court, 
page 140 ~ where the following occurred.) 
.Judge Marshall: Gentlemen, is the poll waived 7 
~fr. Benham: Yes, sir. 
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Mr ... Whiting: Yes, sir. 
The Clerk: Gentlemen of the jury, have you agreed upon 
a verdict? 
The Foreman: ,v c have. 
Judge :Marshall: Hanel it to the clerk. 
("7hcreupon the foreman handed the verdict of the jury 
to the clerk.} 
The Clerk: (Rending) "The jury finds the defendant 
guilty and awards the plaintiff, l\fary Steele Crocker, the sum 
of $10,000 for bodily injuries. 'r. Newton Cather, Foreman." 
So say you all, gentlemen 1 
(And the jury nodded their assent.) 
,Judge Marshall: Gentlemen, is tl1erc any objection to the 
form of the verdict! 
l\fr. Benham: No, sir. 
Mr. ·whiting: No, sir. 
. ,Judge Marshall: The clerk will record the verdict of the 
Jury. 
Gentlemen of the jury, I wish to thank you for the s('rvice 
that you have rendered in this case. ,Jury service is one of 
the most important duties any citizen can render to his com-
munity and to llis state. It is not an easy duty 
page 141 ~ to perform, and you arc not adequately compen-
sated, except in the knowledge of the fact that 
you have performed your duty well. 
Gentlemen: you arc now discharged. 
(The jury having left the box, the following took place in 
the courtroom.) 
:Mr. ·whiting: May it please tl1e court, counsel for defend-
ant moves to set aside the verdict of the jury, as it is contrnry 
to the law and evidence and contrnrv to the instruction:-; to 
the jury, and as furthet· g-1·01mds fo1: our motion, we assign 
the reasons which we assigned in support of our motion to 
strike the evidence of the plaintiff and in support of our 
motion to strike all of the evidence at the conclusion thereof, 
nnd we move tlmt the ,·erdiet be set aside and final judgment 
be entered for the defendant, .Julian D. Steele. 
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(Thereupon, the court heard argument on the foregoing 
motion, and upon tho conclusion of the argument the follow-
ing occurred : ) 
.Judge :Marshall: After full consideration of the motion to 
sot aside the verdict and enter a judgment for the defendant, 
the court is of the opinion that tho verdict is i~ accord with 
the evidence and tho instructions given by tlle court, and the 
motion is the ref ore overruled. 
i\ilr. ·whiting: To which action of the court defendant by 
counsel excepts. 
Judge Marshall: Your exception is noted. 
page 142 ~ On the 23rd day of No,·ember, 1949, an order 
was entered in said court, the same being in the 
words and figures following, to-wit: 
On the 22nd day of November, 1949, came the plaintiff, 
Mary Steele Crocker, in person and by counsel, and likewise 
came defendant, Julian Steele, in person and by counsel, and 
thereupon came a jury, to-wit: :M. l\L l\Icllwee, Arcllie White, 
Clarence Shiley, Russell Tharpe, R. L. Smith, Guy Kelley and 
T. N. Cather, who being swom to well and truly try the issue 
joined and a true verdict give according to tlle evidence, and 
evidence having been introduced bcf ore the court and jury, 
and the trial of the case being continued from five P. M. No-
vember 22nd, to ten A. :M., November 23rd, and the jury hav-
ing rendered their verdict as follows: 
"The jury finds the defendant guilty, and awards the plain-
tiff, Mary Steele Crocker, the sum of $10,000 for bodilv in-
juries. • • 
T. NE.WTON CATHER, Foreman-" 
Thereupon the said defendant, by counsel, moved tbe court 
to set aside the verdict as contrary to the law and the evidence, 
and without evidence to support it, and upon the grounds 
noted in the record in support of the objections and excep-
tions of counsel for defendant to the actions of the court in 
ruling upon various incidents of the trial. But the court ove1·-
ruled said motion and declined to set aside the verdict upon 
ench and every ground offered in support thereof; to which 
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action and ruling of the court defendant, by conn.,. 
page 143} sel, excepted. It was, therefore, adjudged and 
ordered that Mary Steele Crocker, the plaintiff, 
recover and have judgment against defendant, Julian Steele~ 
for the sum of $10,000.00, the amount of the damages by the 
jury in its verdict awarded, with interest thereon at the rate 
of six per cent per annum, from the 23rd day of November, 
1949, until paid, together with the costs of this action. . 
Attorneys for defendant having indicated their desire to 
apply for a writ of error from the ruling of the court, it is 
adjudged and ordered that execution on this judgment is sus-
pended for a period of sixty days from the date hereof to 
enable defendant to apply for a writ of error, but such stay 
of execution shall not become effective until defendant has 
executed bond before the Clerk of this Court in the penalty 
of $2,000.00, with approved surety, conditioned for the pay-
ment of all such damages as may accrue by reason of such 
suspension. 
Enter 
Entered Common Law 
Order Book 26, page 105. 
Seen: 
J. S.K. 
E. M. 
page 144 } NOTICE TO APPLY FOR CERTIFICATION 
OF EVIDENCE A:~H> OTHER INCIDENTS 
OF TRIAL A:t\"'D FOR TRANSCRIPT OF RECORD. 
To Harry R. Kern, Jr., Esq., and Harry K. Benham, Esquire, 
Attorneys of record for Mary Steele Crocker. 
Please take notice that on the 19th day of January, 1950, 
at 10 :00 o'clock, A. :M., in the Office of the Honorable Elliott 
:Marshall, Judge of the Circuit Court of Frederick County, 
Virginia, in tlrn Courthouse of said County, the defendant, 
Julian D. Steele, will tender for verification, certification and 
signature by the said Judge a true and correct transcript of 
the evidence and other incidents of the trial of the case of 
.. 
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Mary Steele Crocker, Plaintiff, v. Julian D. Steele, Defend-
ant, now pending in said coui·t. 
At 2 :00 o'clock., P. l\I., on said date the said defendant, 
Julian D. Steele, will apply to the Clerk of said Circuit Court 
of Fredcl'ick County, Virginia, in the Clerk's Office of said . 
Court, for a transcript of the 1·ecord in the above-mentioned 
action in orde1· that the said def enclant, Julian D. Steele, may 
prepare his application for a w1·it of error and supersedeas 
to tbc supreme Court of Appeals of Vh·ginia. 
J. SLOAN KUYKENDALL 
Counsel for defendant, Julian D. Steele. 
Legal .and timely service of the above notice is hereby ac-
. cepted this 12th day of January, 1950. I desire 
page 145. ~ to be heard or to be present at the time and places 
indicated above. 
HARRY R. KERN, JR. 
HARRY K. BENHAM 
Counsel for Plaintiff, 
Mary Steele Crocker. 
I, Elliott :Marshall, Judge of the Circuit Court of Frederick 
County, Virginia, presided over the trial of the case of 1\Iary 
Steele Crocker, Plaintiff, v. ,J nlian D. Steele, Defendant, in 
the Circuit Court of Frederick County, Virginia, on Novem-
ber 22 and November 2:1, 1949. I do hereby certify that the 
foregoing certificate contains all of the evidence introduced 
and received on bebalf of the plaintiff and on behalf of the 
defendant, together with the objections made thereto aucl 
exceptions taken to the ruling·s of the court on said objections. 
All of said evidence offered and received on behalf of the 
plaintiff and the obje<'tions thereto and exceptions noted to 
the rulings of the court thereon are included within pages 9 
to 94, inclusive, of this certificate, all of which are hereby 
made a part of the record in this action. All of said evidence 
offered and received on behalf of the defendant and the ob-
jections thereto and exceptions noted to the rulings of the 
court thereon are included within pages 101 to 110,. inclusive, 
of this certificate, all of which are hereby made a part of the 
record in this action. 
pnge 146 ~ I do hereby further certify that the foregoing 
certificate contains the motions of the defendant 
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to strike the plaintiff's C\'idence, the grounds assigned for 
said motions; the arguments of counsel for defendant in sup-
port of said motions; tlie arguments of counsel for plaintiff 
in opposition to said motions; the consideration of said mo-
tions by the court and the rulings of the court thereon ; nnd 
the exceptions noted by the defendant to the rulings of the 
court on said motions; all of which are included within pages 
95 to 101, inclusive, and page 111, all of which arc hereby 
made a part of the record in this action. 
I do hereby further certify that the foregoing certificate 
contains the motions of the plaintiff to strike the defendant's 
evidence, the grounds assigned for said motions; the argu-
ments of counsel for plaintiff in support of said motions ; the 
arguments of counsel for defendant in opposition to said mo-
tions; the consideration of said motions by the court and the 
rulings of the court thereon; and the exceptions noted by 
counsel to the rulings of the court on said motions; all of 
which m·e included within pagC's 111 to 116, inclusive, all of 
which arc hereby made a part of the record in this action. 
I do hereby further certify that the foregoing certificate 
contains all of the instructions granted by the ~ourt and read 
to the jury, said instruction being herewith identified as "In-
struction No. 1 ", "Instruction No. 2", "Instruction No. 3", 
Instruction No. 4", "Instruction No. 5'', and "ln-
pagc 147 ~ struction No. 6", all of which instructions nre in-
cluded within page8 116 to 119, inclusive, and all 
of which instructions are hereby made a part of tho record 
in this action. And I clo hereby further certify that this cer-
tificate contains all of the objections to said instructions 
gTanted by the court, the rulings of the court on said ob,jcc-
tions and the exceptions noted by counsel for dcfend:mt, all 
of which objections, rulings nncl exceptions are included with-
in pages 119 to 122, inclrn;ive, and t1ll of which are hereby 
made a part of the record in this action. 
I ·do hereby further certify that the foregoing certificate 
contains all of the instructions offered hv the defendant and 
refused by the court; the objections macfe to the granting of 
snid instructions, the rulings of the court thereon and the 
exceptions noted to the rulings of the court. All of said in-
structions refused hv the court are herebv identified as '' In-
struction No. A", "instruction No. B", "Instruction ~o. C", 
"Instruction ~o. D", "Instruction No. E", Instruction No. 
F", "Iustruction No. G ", "Inst:ruction No. H ", all of which 
instructions, the objections thereto, the rulings of the court 
thereon and the exceptions noted thereto are included within 
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pages 123 to 138, inclusive, of this certificate, and they are all 
hereby made a part of the record in this action. 
I do hereby further certify that the foregoing certificate 
contains the verdict of the jury on page 140 and is hereby 
made a part of the record in this acti011. · I do 
page 148 ~ hereby further eertify that this cel't.ificate con-
tains the motion of the defendant to set aside the 
verdict of the jury and the grounds assigned for said motion, 
together with the ruling of the court on said motion and ex-
ception noted thereto, all of which are contained on page 141 
of this certificate, and are hereby made a part of the record 
in this action. 
I do hereby further certify that the foregoing certificate 
contains all of the pleadings in this action before me for con-
sideration, and the notations for filing thereof, contained 
within pages 1 to 7, inclusive, all of which are a part of the 
record in this action; I <lo herebr further cel'iify that the 
certificate contains on pages 142 and 143 the order and judg-
ment of the court entered on the 28rd day of November, 1949, 
which are a part of the record in this action. 
I <lo hereby further certify that the fo1·egoing certificate 
contains on page 144 notice of counsel for defendant to coun-
sel for plaintiff of bis intention to apply for certificate of 
evidence and otl1er incidents of trial and for transcript of the 
record and notice of bis intention to apply to tbe Clerk of the 
Court for transcript of the record in this action; and ac-
ceptance of service of said notice br coum:el for plaintiff, all 
or which arc hereby made n part of the record in this action. 
I do hereby further certify that the foregoing certificate 
within pages 8 to 141, inclusive, contain otber incidents of 
the trial in t11is action, not specifically enumerated 
page 149 } in this certificate. all of which are bereby made a 
part of the record in this action, and I do further 
certifv tbat this certificate contains all of the incidents of the 
trial in this action. 
I do hereby further certify that the only exhibits offered in 
evidence in the trial of this ease are marked for identifica-
tion "Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1'', "Defendant's Exhibit No. 
l", "Defendant's Exbibit No. 2'', "Defendant's Exhibit No. 
3", and "Defendant's Exhibit No. 4", all of which are pl1oto-
grnphs, and all of said exhibits have been duly authenticated 
by me and are hereby made a part of the record in this case. 
Upon the request of hoth parties hereto such original exhibits 
so authentic·ated shall be forwarded to the Clerk of tlie Su-
preme Court of Appeals to be examined by that court. 
I do l1erehy furtller certify thnt this certificate has been 
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tendered to and signed by me this 19th dav of January, 1950, 
within the time prescribed by Code Section 6252 for tender-
ing and signing bills of exception, and that reasonable notice 
in writing has been given to counsel for the plaintiff of the 
time and pince at which said certificate would be tendered. 
This certificate is made pursuant to Rule No. 21 of the 
Rules of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
Given under my hand this 19tl1 day of January, 1950. 
page 150 } Virginia: 
ELLIOTT MARSHALL, 
Judge.. 
In tlie Circuit Court of Frederick County. 
:Mary Steele Crocker, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Julian D. Steele, Defendant. 
CERTIFICATE OF CLERIC 
I, Lee N. ,vhitacre, CJerk of the Circuit Court of Frederick 
County, Virginia, certify that the foregoing certificate of the 
trial judge, which includes the transcript of the evidence and 
other incidents of the trial of the case of 1\fary Steele Crocker 
v. Julian D. Steele, together with the certificate of the trial 
judge, has been delivered to and filed with me tl1is 19th day 
of January, 1950. 
LEE N. WHITACRE, Clerk. 
Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of Frederick County. 
Mary Steele Crocker, Plaintiff, 
v. 
Julian D. Steele, Defendant. 
I, Lee N. Whitacre, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Frederick 
County, Virginia, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a 
ti·ue and correct transcript of all of the pleading-s filed in said 
action and of all of the orders and judgments en-
page 151 ~ tered by the Circuit Court of Frederick County, 
Virginia, in this action, and all of the record as 
II 
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certified by Honorable Elliott l\[arshall, the trial judge in the 
case of Mary Steele Crocker, Plaintiff, t'. Julian D. Steele, 
Defendant0 in the Circuit Court of Frederick County, Vir-
ginia. _ 
I further certify that legal notice was duly given to tho 
attorneys of record for the plaintiff in said case, of the time 
and place of making application for this correct transcript 
of the record in this case, and legal and timely servic.e of said 
notice was accepted by counsel for plaintiff on the 12th day 
of .January, 1950. 
Given under my hand and seal in my office at " 7inchestcr, 
Frederick County, Virginia, this 19th clay of January, 1950. 
(Seal) LEE N. ,VHITACRE, 
Clerk of the Circuit Court of Frederick 
County, Virginia. 
A Copy-Teste: 
M. B. "\V ATTS, C. C . 
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